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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to describe and analyze the problem of 
environmental degradation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the 
context of international relations theory. Using the concepts of 
sustainable development and the theory of the commons, this analysis 
seeks to broaden understanding how the degradation occurred and how 
further degradation may be avoided in the future. It begins by 
explaining the global environmental debate, into which the states of 
CEE have not quite been incorporated. It then explains how, prior to 
the 1989 political changes in the Soviet bloc, the planned economies 
of CEE were characterized by an emphasis on heavy industry, high 
output, and the the use of less energy-efficient fuels such as brown 
coal. The lack of a pricing mechanism to reflect relative scarcity of 
natural resources, along with the use of outdated industrial 
technology, both contributed to an overuse of natural resources. The 
effect on the environment has been significant. A survey of 
environmental pollution, as well'\as human health data which may be 
relevant, provides empirical evidencç. Finally, a review of 
multilateral assistance to the region shows that the international 
community is taking a part in the attempt to set the region on a path 
to sustainable development, as well as to curb potential 
transboundary pollution and further degradation of "the commons."
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Introduction
In late 1989, members of the Western world watched as citizens 
of East and West Berlin dismantled the Berlin Wall, symbolizing the 
the collapse of the Soviet Union's power, military might and regional 
economic system. As intellectuals and political commentators pondered 
"the end of history," visions of a new central and eastern Europe 
(CEE)^ took shape. In the West, particularly, visions emerged of a 
Europe without a need for American troop deployment, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact or economic and political borders. 
For much of the world community, peace, prosperity and democracy for 
the former Eastern Bloc states were the hopes of the day. Even the 
European Union (EU), then the European Community (EC), had high 
expectations for integration of CEE into the Western capitalistic 
system, and within two years had established association agreements 
with some states as a precursor to their economic, political and 
cultural integration into the Community.^ Yet despite the EC's 
actions, as well as other initiatives that took place to aid CEE in 
its transition to market-based economies, major changes wereN.occurring, and had already occurred, in CEE which made it clear that 
integration would not come quickly. Democracy and integration could 
only follow economic restructuring, and the social, political and 
economic difficulties encountered since the political changes of 1989 
have shown that the challenges the states of CEE faced in 
transforming their command economies to market systems was somwhat 
underestimated. The removal of Soviet power opened up a Pandora's 
box of ills in the region, complicating, and in some cases crippling, 
the reform process. In Yugoslavia, economic dislocation and long- 
supressed ethnic animosities escalated into clashes which resulted in 
a devastating civil war that would break up the state, and age-old 
ethnic problems led to new international tension such as that between 
Greece and Yugoslav Macedonia. The division of Czechoslovakia into 
two states led to a rude awakening for Slovakia, where uncompetitive 
industries prevented the country from progressing toward its goal of 
becoming a strong state. In Poland and Hungary, already unmanageable 
foreign debt deterred borrowing for potentially profitable projects, 
and disputes over water resources increased tension between Hungary
and the new Slovak republic,^ thus forcing the two states to 
contemplate complex changes in political status, international 
relationships and sovereignty. In the Russian Federation, 
disaffection with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s political style 
and pace of economic reforms contributed to an unsuccessful coup 
d'etat in October 1993 when members of parliament tried to oust him 
from his position. The October events harked back to another 
unsuccessful coup in the summer of 19 91, which marked the beginning 
of the end of the Soviet union itself, finally dissolved in December 
1991. Conflicts between states such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
bloody civil wars such as the one in Georgia, would push economic 
transformation down on the list of priorities.
One problem in the region underlying all the others, both 
literally and figuratively, has been the problem of environmental 
degradation. During the 1980s, but particularly after the political 
changes in 1989-1990, information became available which showed that 
virtually every state in CEE had pockets of environmental pollution 
which over the decades had become so severe as to affect the quality 
of life of many of the region's i n h a b i t a n t s . ^ While i t  is difficult 
to prove a direct link between environmental degradation and poor 
public health (in part due to high rates of smoking and other 
lifestyle characteristics), World Health Organization data indicate 
that the prospects for people living in central Europe are the 
bleakest in the industrialized world.5 For instance, in Hungary in 
1991, life expectancy at age one was 69.5 years, compared with 
France's, which was 77.1 years, and Sweden's, which was 77.2.^
Another key health indicator for the same states, infant mortality, 
also indicates lower quality of life in CEE compared with the West. 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births in Hungary in 1989 was 15.74, 
compared with 7.54 in France, and 5.77 in Sweden. Deaths from 
diseases of the respiratory system (ages 0-64), an indicator that may 
be cautiously viewed as representative of environmental quality, show 
a similar trend. Deaths from respiratory diseases amounted to 20.33 
per 100,00 0 in Hungary in 1989, compared with 8.0 6 for France and
7.5 0 for Sweden.7
Environmental damage in Central and Eastern Europe can be 
traced to the command economy and its impact on the distribution and 
utilization of resources.& After World War II when the Soviet Union
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was extending its sphere of influence to CEE and command economies 
were established, resources became subject to a hierarchical system 
of distribution, and government ministries within each state formed 
an umbrella for enterprises under their jurisdictions. As a result, 
materials such as coal were often transported long distances to fuel 
industries created to fulfill output quotas set by governments rather 
than by the market. With activity governed by high output targets 
and prices of raw materials bearing little relationship to relative 
cost and scarcity, the quantity of energy resources procured and 
consumed were often not the optimal amount required for production of 
a particular product.^ Pressure to meet, and even exceed, ambitious 
production targets prompted ministries to develop their own, often 
expensive, sources of energy. This contributed to a delay in the 
transformation from solid fuels to cleaner and more efficient oil and 
g a s . M u c h  of the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in 
CEE is attributed to the burning of brown coal, which has a higher 
sulfur content and as little as half the energy yield of harder 
coals.11 Energy consumption data show that command economies 
generally used about twice as much energy per inhabitant as market 
I economies with comparable per capita GDPs, and twice as much energy 
per unit of GDP as either the Thir& World or the Western 
industrialized economies. 1^  Environmental problems were compounded 
by the dumping of industrial waste containing heavy metals and toxic 
chemicals into soil and waterways.13
The environment did not go totally unrecognized by the CEE 
states as an asset worthy of protection. Environmental laws were 
technically in force in some states as early as the 19 60s, becoming 
more targeted in the 1970s, and state institutions were assigned to 
deal with the e n v i r o n m e n t . ^ ^  However, the laws went largely 
unenforced in part due to the seemingly contradictory role the state 
would have had to play by fining its own enterprises.1^  In the 
1980s, the years following the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster 
were marked by increased public participation in groups aimed at 
making CEE's environmental problems known internationally.^^ In a 
time of deteriorating economic conditions, activity among non­
governmental environmental groups was one of the only tolerated forms 
of political protest. The efforts of these non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) served to expose details which exposed decades 
of exploitation of the air, water and soil by the region's
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industries. In Bulgaria, public outrage regarding intense 
transboundary air pollution from Romania into the town of Ruse led to 
the formation of the Committee for Environmental Protection of Ruse. 
Though short-lived, the committee provided a precedent for a larger 
group called Ecoglasnost which played a key role in the fall of the 
political leadership in 1989.17 Hungary, the existence of nature
protection organizations as early as the 197 0s were the precedent for 
the broad protests in the 1980s against the joint Hungarian- 
Czechoslovak construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Dam on the 
Danube r i v e r . I n  1989, the Hungarian environmental movement, which 
included a broad cross-section of the general public, succeeded in 
pressuring the Hungarian government to abandon its end of the dam 
proj ect.1^
The movements of the 1980s were significant as catalysts in the 
transition toward more open societies. Yet amid the economic and 
political upheavals in 1989, green movements across CEE experienced a 
rapid "ungreening;" as soon as other forms of political protest 
became acceptable, economic concerns began to take priority at the 
expense of environmental concerns. Those involved in environmental 
advocacy organizations such as Bulgaria's Ecoglasnost by necessity 
had to#shift focus to deal with ^ e  larger issues of political and 
economic change. In the winter of 1989-9 0, Ecoglasnost had membership 
of about 70,000, but in the few years 'following, during which time 
the group joined the coalition seeking to depose the communist 
government, Ecoglasnost's membership dwindled to between 8,000 and 
9,000.20 Hungary, too, the environmental movement which succeeded
in disengaging the country from the Danube dam project disintegrated 
not long after the battle was won, and as soon as the challenge of 
economic and political restructuring b e g a n . 2 1  Government 
environmental priorities had also shifted: in Slovenia, the Slovenia 
Environmental project, a government program to address high-priority 
ecological problems with financing from the World Bank, was shelved 
as the political turbulence of 1991 commanded attention elsewhere.22
The waning of support for green movements in CEE does not 
obscure the fact that the environment is in need of rehabilitation, 
and that careful planning must be undertaken to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past. The task of transforming centrally planned 
economies to market economies is huge : the necessary legal 
institutions must be set up, finance industries developed, other
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industries dismantled or privatized and social guarantees established 
for those displaced as a result of economic restructuring. Managers 
need training, ministries need streamlining, and most of all, the 
region needs foreign investment. The struggle between economic 
development and the achievement of environmental quality is ever­
present in CEE as the states of the region strive towards integration 
into the world economy, and particularly integration into the EU, 
which has stringent requirements for accession.23
CEE's transition comes at a time when Western states are also 
evaluating the route they have taken to economic development. The 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janiero had as its focus the achievement of sustainable 
development by both industrialized and developing states. The idea of 
sustainable development first emerged in 198 0 in the World 
Conservation Strategy (WCS), produced by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature, World Wildlife Fund, and the United 
Nations Environmental Program. WCS was widely seen as having 
neglected economics in its discussion of conservation.24 Our Common 
Future, also known as the Brundtland report after its chairperson Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, the Norwegian prime minister, rectified this 
somewhat by including input from ecc^omists and seeking to integrate 
economic planning and environmental management.25 The Brundtland 
Report, which many now see as the primary text on sustainable 
development, makes little mention of CEE, perhaps because it was 
written in the early 1980s before much of the information on CEE 
pollution became available. Yet much of what the report covers can 
be applied to CEE, particularly its oft-quoted declaration: 
"Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of 
the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the 
future."26 other aspects of the report which can be applied to CEE 
include its position that "in the final analysis, sustainable 
development must rest on political will."27 With continuous 
challenges and difficulties regarding economic restructuring, 
political will on the part of the CEE states themselves will be 
crucial in determining their paths to development.
Pearce, Barbier and Markandya, in the Preface to their book 
Sustainable Development: Economics and Environment in the Third 
World, maintain that the subject of sustainable development is 
"fuzzy," with "no neat solutions."2& One of the reasons for the
perceived amorphousness of the concept may x-e the difficulty many 
social scientists inevitably have in coming grips with the 
multiple subjects required to execute a balanced analysis of the 
nature and scope of the issues concerning nasnainable development.
This is particularly true for the states ci Z2E, where transformation 
to pluralist market-based societies has rercired political 
resiliency, cultural adjustment and major nccial sacrafice. Any 
study which identifies the need or prospecm for sustainable 
development must first define the term, and second, must examine the 
political, economic and social ingredients cf such a condition. The 
"Tragedy of the Commons" theory, originated by Hardin in 1968, 
considered along with sustainable development can enhance our 
understanding of how pollution occurred and bow similar patterns of 
growth can be avoided in the future. The theory of the commons seeks 
to provide an explanation for how and why btmans allow problems such 
as pollution and depletion of natural resources to o c c u r . 29 An 
understanding of the commons allows us to conceptualize pollution's 
effect on such natural resources as air, oceans and outer space.
Viewing the problem of environmental degradation in CEE in an 
international relations context allows us to link the region with the 
other states and regions. Pollution is by nature transboundary, 
which means environmental degradation in CEE may be shared with 
neighboring states, or, in the case of the Chernobyl disaster, other 
regions. The nature of CEE's problems puts it in a situation of 
dependency on wealthier states for technical and financial 
assistance. Attracting investment depends to a great extent on the 
willingness of the CEE states to provide a favorable atmosphere and 
guarantee investors protection from existing environmental 
pollution.30 This point is crucial in understanding that analyzing 
prospects for sustainability in a region is in fact a study of the 
region's ability to manage its own future. Political priorities in 
such states as Hungary have been such that getting the economy moving 
is more important to the public than cleaning up the environment; the 
dwindling of environmental activism has been evidence of this 
phenomenon.
This dissertation has three chapters which seek to provide an 
understanding of how CEE got into its present environmental state and 
what its chances are of progressing toward a cleaner future. The 
first chapter will deal with the theoretical underpinnings of
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environmental politics in international relations. How and why did 
the environment become an issue-area in the discipline of 
international relations? What is sustainable development and the 
theory of the commons and what are their relevance to CEE? What are 
the primary international relations theories most relevant'to 
discussing environmental issues in CEE? Placing the somewhat 
amorphous idea of sustainable development into the context of 
international relations will expose its weaknesses and strengths as a 
tool for analyzing environmental degradation in CEE.
Chapter Two will give a detailed explanation of how CEE states 
arrived at their present state of environmental crisis. It will 
address aspects of Marxist theory which may have provided the 
ideological basis for utilization of natural resources in the planned 
economies of CEE. Hungary will be used as a case study to highlight 
some of the primary pollution problems in the region. In addition, 
data will be provided indicating that Hungarians are far worse off 
than western Europeans in terms of human health. An explanation of 
the command economy structure will serve to highlight aspects of the 
economic system that contributed to waste and pollution.
Chapter Three will deal with outside guidance and assistance in 
CEE, highlighting the nature of international activities in the 
region. The European Union PHARE program, the the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development -- which states in its founding 
Agreement a commitment to "promote in the full range of its 
activities environmentally sound and sustainable development"31 __ 
and the US Agency for International Development programs will be 
scrutinized as primary examples of the West's approach.
Environmental rehabilitation and economic development are two 
goals that can be achieved either together or apart. This study will 
seek to determine the prospects for the region's success in fusing 
the two -- an achievement that few states can claim as theirs.
 ^ The term central and eastern Europe (CEE) will be used throughout tliis study to refer to what 
prior to the break-up of tlie USSR was usually referred to as "Eastern Europe." For the purposes of 
my analysis on environmental degradation in tlie region, tlie term CEE applies broadly to the six 
former full members of the CMEA in tlie region -  Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, the states of the 
former Czechoslovkia, Romania and the GDR -  as well as to tlie former Yugoslavia and Albania.
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The Soviet Union is not included in my "CEE," However, much of the analysis provided in this 
study will will also apply to the republics of tlie former USSR. Due to tlie limited size of this 
dissertation, Hungary has been chosen as a case study to examine issues affecting states in 
transition from centrally planned economies to market-based economies. Reasons why will be 
examined later.
2 "Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Commission 
of the European Communities background report, 17 February 1993, p. 3.
3 Karoly Okolicsany, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension: Bratislava Diverts tlie Danube," RFE/RL 
Research Report, Vol. 1, no. 49, December 11, 1992, pp. 49-54.
4 Duncan Fisher, Paradise Deferred: Environmental Policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe 
(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Ecological Studies Insititue, 1992), pp. 2-3.
See also articles on the environment in CEE: "Darkness at Noon," Time International, vol. 135, 
no. 15., April 9, 1990, pp. 24-25; and "Waming-Freedom can be dangerous to your health," Time 
International, vol. 143., no. 26, June 27, 1994, pp. 18-20.
Articles on the Soviet environmental situation include: Mike Edwards, "Living with Chernobyl," 
National Geographic, August, 1994, pp. 99-115; Mike Edwards, "Pollution in the former U SSR- 
Lethal Legacy," National Geographic, August, 1994, pp. 70-98; and "Turning Water to Dust," 
Newsweek International, vol. CXV, no, 4, January 22, 1990, p. 16.
3 World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-93: A Guide to the Global Environment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 62.
6 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, Health For All, health indicators 
database on Europe, Bilthoven, the Netherlands (undated). Figures represent most recent data 
available for the three countries; 1991 for Hungary, 1990 for France and 1989 for Sweden. These 
three countries were selected for this comparison because they represent three distinct parts of 
Europe,
WHO stresses tliat users of tliis data should take into consideration varying definitions and 
measurement practices used in different countries.
7
o World Resources Institute, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
 ^ Nigel Swain, Hungary: The rise and fall of feasible socialism (London: Verso, 1992), p. 57. 
Robert Bideleux, Communism and Development (London: Methuen and Co., 1985), p. 142. 
World Resources Institute, pp. cit., pp. 61.
12 Bideleux. op. cit.. p. 151.
13 World Resources Institute, pp. pif., p. 64.
14 Duncan Fisher, pp. pit., p. 4.
13 Government of Hungary, Hungary's National Report to United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, Budapest, December 1991, p. 25.
16 Duncan Fisher, pp. pit., p. 39.
17 Ibid.. pp. 5, 39.
1  ^ Personal interview witli Ivan Gyulai, director of the Ecological Institute for Sustainable 
Development in Miskolc, Hungary, September, 1993.
1  ^ Duncan Fisher, pp. pit., p. 33.
20 Ibid., p. 7, 42.
21 Personal interview with Ivan Gyulai, Director, Ecological Institute for Sustainable 
Development, Miskolc, Hungary, September 1993.
22 Duncan Fisher, pp. pit., p. 45.
23 Personal interview witli Thomas Glazer, head of PHARE information office, European Union, 
Brussels, September 1994.
24 David Pearce, Edward Barbier, Anil Markandya, Sustainable Development: Economies and 
environment in the third world (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar Publications Ltd., 1990), p. ix.
23 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 37.
26 Ibid., p. 40.
27 Ibid., p. 9.
28 David Pearce, et. al., pp. pit., p. x.
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30 Stephen R. Wassersug, Program Manager, Regional Environmental Center for CEE, "Meeting 
tlie Environmental Challenge: Balancing Environmental-Deveiopment Goals," presented at 
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Washington, D.C. (not dated)
31 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Environmental Procedures, London,
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Chapter 1
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 PROM STOCKHOLM TO RIO: THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In order to view the problem of environmental degradation in 
CEE as an international relations issue, it is useful to place the 
region into the context of the global environmental debate. Though 
environmental issues were a matter of international concern prior to 
the 1970s,1 it was not until the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972 that the environment was formally introduced into 
global politics as an issue treated holistically. The Stockholm 
Conference ushered in a new era in international relations as the 
problem of environmental degradation was elevated onto the world 
s t a g e . 2 The conference was organized amid growing activity by NGOs 
concerned with the effects of industrial pollution in the developed 
world. With representatives from over 10 0 states (minus the Eastern 
Bloc, notably absent due to a^boycott proclaimed for the West's 
decision not to recognize the GDR)the conference's existence 
demonstrated the realization that unilateral actions by states could 
not solve problems which transcended national b o u n d a r i e s .  ^ By its 
very nature the Stockholm Conference turned concerns about use and 
abuse of the environment, what used to be merely the concern of 
scientists or activists, into matters of international r e l a t i o n s . ^  
Just as significantly, the Stockholm Conference demonstrated the 
connection between the hitherto separate issues of environment and 
development and placed them within a North/South context, marking the 
beginning of a protracted debate which would escalate over subsequent 
decades, driven by the North's desire to stem the depletion and 
degradation of the global e n v i r o n m e n t . 5  By this time it had become 
clear that the biosphere could not tolerate an industrial revolution 
in the South on the scale of that experienced by the North without 
new approaches to development, approaches characterized by 
conservation and cleanliness rather than unlimited consumption and 
waste-production.
The conference produced a declaration on the Human Environment 
and an Action Plan for the Human Environment.^ The Stockholm 
declaration contains 26 principles on environment and development. 
Principle 21 acknowledged state sovereignty over national resources 
but adds that states have "the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.Principle 21 is seen in international law 
as a precedent for much of the environmental diplomacy of subsequent 
decades. The Action Plan contained 109 recommendations on six 
issues: human settlements, natural resource management, pollution of 
international significance, educational and social aspects of the 
environment, development and environment, and international 
organizations.8 The conference provided the catalyst for the 
formation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which 
has played a key role in relations between the UN, governments and 
NGOs. UNEP, formed under UN General Assembly Resolution XXVII, was 
organized "as a focal point for environmental action and coordination 
within the UN system."  ^ Based in Nairobi, UNEP is concerned with 
activities regarding the environment and development, oceans, water, 
terrestrial ecosystems, arid land& and desertification control, 
regional and technical cooperation aijd health and human 
settlements.10 Despite a meager annual budget, most of which is 
based on voluntary contributions (the program budget for 1990-91 set 
a spending target of just $68 million),H  UNEP has played a central 
role in the adoption of international agreements such as the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 and the 
subsequent Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone 
Layer in 1987.12
Outside the more formal structure of the United Nations and 
international conferences, environmental movements gained momentum 
through the 1980s as the scientific community's view of global 
environmental problems shifted toward an acknowledgement that the 
Earth's systems are not as stable and resilient to human abuse as 
previously thought.H This was true in the states of the Soviet bloc 
as well as in the West.l^ In 1987, geochemist Wallace Broecker 
commented in the journal Nature on recent polar ice-core and ocean- 
sediment data:
I I I !
What these records indicate is that Earth’s climate does not 
respond to forcing in a smooth and gradual way. Rather, it 
responds in sharp jumps which involve large-scale 
reorganization of Earth's system.... We must consider the 
possibility that the main responses of the system to our 
provocation of the atmosphere will come in jumps whose timing 
and magnitude are unpredictable.15
Homer-Dixon calls the mid-1980s discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole
a "paradigm-shattering" example of such non-linear reactions as
Broecker described.1& Much of the scientific community's concern
spilled over to the general public during the 1980s. Media coverage
of the dangers of ozone depletion alerted the public to the potential
ill effects environmental degradation could have on humans, and an
unusually hot summer in North America in 1988 sparked American fears
of global warming. Starting in late 1989, the realization in the
West that the Cold War was coming to an end further brought
environmental issues to the fore; as concerns about superpower
conflict began to fade, other problems surfaced into the public
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 17 The Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in
Ukraine in April 1986 shocked and horrified Western states as the
fallout awakened them to the potential repercussions of transboundary
pollution.
In June 1992, the United Nations Conference on the Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janiero (UNCED) took environmental politics 
a step beyond Stockholm, transforming the decades-old quest for a 
cleaner Earth from a movement dominated by interest groups to a 
highly publicized intergovernmental debate. In his opening address, 
UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong focused on the future, 
emphasizing that the conference "is not an end in itself, but a new 
beginning... The results of this conference will ultimately depend on 
the credibility and effectiveness of its f o l l o w - u p . A m o n g  
Strong's concerns was that any institutional changes made within the 
United Nations system must "provide an effective and credible basis 
for its continued leadership of this p r o c e s s . T h e  amount of 
treaties signed and declarations issued were not to be used as 
criterion for the meeting's success; rather the conference was to be 
judged on the basis of its contribution to the overall process of 
curbing environmental degradation and promoting sustainable and 
environmentally sound development.^0 To achieve this, one of UNCED‘s 
central goals was to harmonize varying paths different states have 
taken toward environmental protection. This objective was largely
motivated by the knowledge that in poorer states, policies of 
environmental protection on their own can not solve problems 
associated with poverty such as hunger and disease; thus the 
conference's link between environment and development.21
Dubbed the "Earth Summit" by the world media, the conference of 
more than 150 states and 1,400 nongovernmental organizations embedded 
the problem of global environmental degradation into the public 
consciousness. Though the "Development" aspect of the conference was 
given secondary treatment by the popular media, at the conference 
itself, the economic divide between the developed North and the 
lesser-developed South was more pronounced than ever.22 The 
dichotomy between what structural theories of international relations 
and the political left have been describing for years as "core" and 
"periphery" suddenly became tangible as players from each region were 
pitted against each other on issues ranging from trade protectionism 
to biodiversity.23 The North had finally found a forum for its 
environmental woes, though its approach was not without criticism. 
Skeptics argued that recent proposals by the North regarding how 
industrializing states should manage their economic development were 
merely a form of neo-colonialism.24
\ . iThe Rio Conference was issue-specific--focusing' qn such issues
as climate change, biodiversity and d'hf.orestation--not region-
specific, and as such did not address the unique environmental
challenges of any one r e g i o n . 25 Thus from the events which
transpired at the conference it is difficult to extrapolate the
precise attitude of the North regarding the environmental situation
in the "other North"--that is, central and eastern Europe. Janos
Zlinszky, a team leader at the Regional Environmental Center for
Central and Eastern Europe (REC) in Budapest, says UNCED "did not
have any real repercussions" in CEE, as the conference focused on
creating an agenda for global issues, not regional ones.26 He adds:
"The fact that the US was reluctant to agree to some of the issues at
UNCED deflated the conference’s impact somewhat." However, from the
REC's perspective, UNCED was successful in its mission to bring
environmental issues onto the international a g e n d a . 27 Despite a
lack of policy formation regarding, for instance. Western Europe's
view toward transboundary air pollution from CEE, the fact that the
Rio conference even occurred was enough exposure for the cause of
environmental rehabilitation for even the heavily bureaucratized EC
ni
to take resolute action. Community statements in the year following 
UNCED stated its goal to curb transboundary pollution and to assist 
its eastern neighbors toward a path of sustainable development. The 
PHARE program (Poland and Hungary Aid to Restructuring Economies), to 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, is a tangible example of this 
initiative.28 in another effort to match words with actions, the 
European Commission in March 1993 approved 20m ECUs for a 
multilateral fund to improve nuclear safety in the former Soviet 
Union and central and eastern Europe. By the end of 19 93, the 
Commission had contributed about 33 0m ECUs to the fund, some 60% of 
the total agreed by the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations at its 
July 19 92 meeting in Munich. Other contributors included the US (24m 
ECUs), Japan (19.5m ECUs), Canada (19m ECUs) and the Nordic countries 
(10m ECUs).29
Despite UNCED's lack of regional focus, several documents were 
signed by heads of governments, among them the Rio Declaration, a 
statement of broad principles to guide national behavior on 
environmental protection and development, and Agenda 21, a detailed 
document outlining work plans for sustainable development, including 
goals, responsibilities and funding e s t i m a t e s . 20 The Rio Declaration\  Iincludes 27 principles encompassing key elements of the'political 
agendas of both industrialized and developing states. Principle 2, 
for example, outlines a state's sovereign right to exploit its own 
resources in accordance with its own policies without harming the 
environment outside of its boundaries, while Principle 4 states that 
environmental protection is an integral part of d e v e l o p m e n t . 21 
Agenda 21, a 280-page work plan focusing on goals and priorities for 
resource, environmental, social, legal, financial and institutional 
issues, includes program descriptions and cost estimates. Chapter 
Nine on atmosphere seeks to promote action to combat climate change, 
ozone depletion and transboundary air pollution. Chapter 3 8 contains 
the UNCED recommendations for international institutions, among then 
the establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development to 
monitor implementation of the issues discussed at R i o . 22 Inherent in 
all of Agenda 21 is the goal of reducing activities deemed 
environmentally harmful such as deforestation and excessive 
industrial emissions. Though not legally binding. Agenda 21 is 
intended as a guideline for action. Also signed at UNCED were 
binding conventions on climate change and biodiversity, which were
not actually negotiated at the conference but were signed in Rio 
after separate n e g o t i a t i o n s .23 An international agreement on 
tropical forestry was adopted as well, but in the form of a non- 
legally-binding statement of p r i n c i p l e s . 2 4
Despite the tangible written results which emerged from UNCED, 
Secretary-General Strong's statement at the beginning of the 
conference held true: UNCED's main contribution to the.cause of 
environmental rehabilitation and sustainable development was its role 
in the entire process, and ultimately it was the followup which would 
transpire after UNCED that would judge the merits of the meeting.
Only the passage of time will see Strong's prophesy through, but like 
Stockholm, UNCED's very existence was testament to the fact that 
enough people care about the environment to transport their leaders 
en masse to Brazil for discussion and debate. The massive media 
attention and NGO activity before, during and after the conference 
transformed environmental issues from the preoccupation of various 
groups to the public mindset, exactly where it needs to be if 
policymakers are ever going to be compelled to take action on 
environment degradation, in CEE, or anywhere else.
UNCED's failure to address the environmental problems of CEE 
specifically may have been because the region does not face such dire 
problems as famine, and therefore requires less urgency. It may also 
be due to the nature of the meeting as well as to widespread 
perceptions about the nature of transition in CEE. The conference, 
with its emphasis on such environmental dilemmas as biodiversity, 
deforestation and climate change, took a global approach, and the 
overriding dialogue between participants (or at least that which was 
publicized) was between the wealthy states of the industrialized 
North and the poorer developing states of the South. The absence of 
any major mention of the environmental devastation in CEE so soon 
after the political and economic changes was noteworthy, and may 
suggest that the primary actors in the global environmental debate -- 
North and South -- may still perceive the states of CEE as 
constituting the single bloc to which they belonged prior to 1989 . 
When they were part of the Soviet sphere, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and others were viewed largely as 
one entity, not as dozens of states with unique economic and 
political characteristics and distinct problems and challenges. The 
lack of attention at UNCED to CEE's environmental problems is only
now starting to give way to recognition that the "bloc" is a 
complicated region with complicated problems, and epitomizes the oft- 
discussed tension between economic development and environmental 
quality which was at the very heart of the Rio conference.
1.2 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT DEFINED
If UNCED's focus was primarily on the First and Third Worlds, 
leaving the Second to find its own niche in the global environmental 
debate, then what about the applicability to CEE of the concept of 
sustainable development, a central theme at UNCED? To understand the 
meaning of sustainable development and how it might apply CEE, a 
region which has only recently attracted mainstream interest for its 
environmental problems, this section will provide various definitions 
of the term and seek to apply those definitions to the region. An 
understanding of sustainable development will set the framework for 
an analysis in Chapter 2 of which features of the command economy 
system led to environmental degradation in CEE. Sustainable 
development can also function as a benchmark with which to analyze 
environmental activities in CEE as the states make their transition 
to market-based pluralist s o c i e t i e s . 25 Lastly, the concept's 
applicability to global issues will be compared and contrasted with 
its applicability to the challenges faced by smaller communities.
Sustainable development is a broad and sometimes elusive 
concept, but not for a lack of effort in attempting to define it.
Our Common Future, or the Brundtland report, is widely accepted as 
providing one of the most comprehensive definitions, and even though 
it heavily emphasizes problems associated with the world's poor and 
developing states, much of the report can be applied to CEE as well. 
Underlying the Brundtland report's view of sustainable development is 
the idea that environment quality and economic development are not 
separate challenges, but are "inexorably linked" not only to each 
other, but also to themselves and to other aspects of society.2 6 
Environmental problems are linked to one another; for instance, air 
pollution may contribute to the degradation of forests and lakes, and 
ill-suited agricultural and industrial policies can cause 
environmental damage to soil and rivers. Environmental str.esses and 
patterns of economic development are also linked to one another due 
to the necessity of natural resource use to fuel development.27 Both
of these links are particularly applicable to the states of CEE, 
where various types of pollution have exacerbated the effects of 
other types of pollution. Central planning policies, meanwhile, with 
their high output targets and lack of a market pricing mechanism, 
caused stress on the environment as industries used natural resources 
to e x c e s s . 38 The Brundtland report further states that environmental 
and economic problems are linked to many social and political 
factors. Though the report gives examples of overpopulation to 
illustrate this point,39 this relationship between factors can 
equally be applied to CEE, where large, polluting industries are 
being dismantled with severe social and political costs.
The Brundtland report describes sustainable development from 
many different angles, but one statement makes the point concisely: 
"Sustainable development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of 
the present without compromising the ability to meet those of the 
future."40 The beginning of the Brundtland report's chapter on 
sustainable development states that the concept of "needs" 
particularly applies to the world's poor, to which overriding 
priority should be given.41 The report emphasizes that some burden- 
sharing will have to occur: "Far from requiring the cessation of 
economic growth, it recognizes t^at the problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment cannot be solved ui^ess we have a new era of growth 
in which developing countries play a large role and reap large 
benefits."42 Strategic imperatives in the pursuit of sustainable 
development include:
• reviving growth;
• changing the quality of growth;
• meeting essential needs for jobs, food, energy, water and 
sanitation;
• ensuring a sustainable level of population;
• conserving and enhancing the resource base;
• reorienting technology and managing risk; and
• merging environment and economics in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 43
With the exception of population, the above can apply equally well to 
highly developed states such as the US or UK as they do to CEE or the 
underdeveloped states. The report states: "The world must quickly 
design strategies that will allow nations to move from their present, 
often destructive, processes of growth and development onto 
sustainable development paths. This will require policy changes in
all countries...".44
Another key dimension of sustainable development the report 
identifies is "the idea of limitations imposed by the state of 
technology and social organization on the environment's ability to 
meet present and future needs."45 This suggests that the concept of 
sustainable development does imply limits, including that of 
governments (social organizations) and the current state of 
technology, to achieve sustainability. This point has particular 
applicability to the states of CEE; prior to 1989, the political 
systems presented impediments to achieving economic development which 
was sustainable. As described above, central planning, which was 
controlled by the Communist Party, mandated output targets which were 
not necessarily in line with demand, and the lack of a pricing 
mechanism to reflect supply and demand led to overuse of energy 
inputs, which contributed to environmental degradation.46 Central 
planning will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, and the 
problem with pricing, or the "zero-price phenomenon," will be 
discussed in section 1.3.
On the subject of consumption standards, the Brundtland report 
notes that the average person in an industrial market economy uses 
more than 80 times as much energy as someone in sub-Saharan A f r i c a , 47 
yet to raise developing countries' enèrgy use to industrialized 
country levels would require increasing present global energy use by 
a factor of f i v e . 48 The environment could not tolerate such an 
increase, particularly if the increase consisted of non-renewable 
fossil fuels, the report maintains; based on the present mix of 
energy sources, increasing energy use by even a factor of two is 
unrealistic due to the estimated threat of global warming and 
acidification of the e n v i r o n m e n t . 49 "Energy efficiency policies must 
be the cutting edge of national energy strategies for sustainable 
development, and there is much scope for improvement in this 
d i r e c t i o n ."50 The report suggests more energy-efficient appliances, 
increased research and development on environmentally sound and 
ecologically viable energy sources, and changes in energy prices to 
encourage the adoption of conservation m e a s u r e s . 5 1
With industrial production having increased more than fifty 
times over the past 100 years and more growth likely, the Brundtland 
report maintains that the time to address sustainable development is 
now.52 One of the pressing reasons for this is that industries most
heavily dependent on environmental resources and most heavily 
polluting are growing most rapidly in developing countries, where 
there is both more urgency for growth and less capacity to minimize 
degradation of the environment. 3^ The Brundtland report is diligent 
in addressing the future: "We borrow environmental capital from
future generations with no intention or prospect of repaying. They 
may damn us for our spendthrift ways, but they can never collect on 
our debt to them. We act as we do because we can get away with it; 
future generations do not vote; they have no political power or 
financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions."^4
Other definitions of sustainable development also address the 
importance of renewable resources. World Resources Institute sums up 
sustainable development as the utilization of natural resources in a 
manner that "does not eliminate or degrade them or otherwise diminish 
their usefulness for future generations, while maintaining constant 
or non-declining stocks of natural resources such as soil, 
groundwater and b i o m a s s . "55 Pearce, Markandya and Barbier provide 50 
definitions of sustainable development in Annex 1 of Blueprint for a 
Green Economy. 56 ^ definition by Pearce and Markandya, writing in
the journal Project Appraisal, is among them: "The basic idea [of 
sustainable development] is simply in the context of natural 
resources (excluding exhaustibles) a^ nd environments: the use made of 
these inputs to the development process should be sustainable through 
time.... If we now apply the idea to resources, sustainability ought 
to mean that a given stock of resources--trees, soil quality, water 
and so on--should not d e c l i n e . 5 7  Robert Allen, in his book How to 
Save the World (London: Kogan Page, 1980), maintains: "Sustainable 
development -- development that is likely to achieve lasting 
satisfaction of human needs and improvement of the quality of human 
l i f e . "58 Both definitions apply directly to the problems in CEE; 
natural resource use in the former command-economy systems, as 
described earlier, has been central to the degradation of the 
e n v i r o n m e n t . 5 9  Quality of life is also directly applicable to the 
region when discussing it in the context of development. Health data 
cited in Chapter 2 of this study show that life expectancy and other 
key indicators for CEE indicate that quality of life in the region is 
far below that of western E u r o p e . 50 Also quoted in the annex of 
Blueprint for a Green Economy is Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, who in a lecture on October 8, 1986, said:
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There are many dimensions to sustainability. First, it 
requires the elimination of poverty and deprivation. Second, 
it requires the conservation and enhancement of the resources 
base which alone can ensure that the elimination of the poverty 
is permanent. Third, it requires a broadening of the concept 
of development so that it covers not only economic growth but 
also social and cultural development. Fourth, and most 
important, it requires the unification of economics and ecology 
in decision-making at all levels.51
Edward Barbier, writing in the journal Environmental Conservation,
takes a similar tack: "In general terms, the primary objective [of
sustainable development] is reducing the absolute poverty of the
world's poor through providing lasting and secure livelihoods that
minimize resource depletion, environmental degradation, cultural
disruption and social i n s t a b i l i t y ."52 with their emphasis on
poverty as the focal point for sustainable development, both
Brundtland and Barbier's definitions take some creative thinking to
apply to the states of the former Soviet bloc. Relative to western
Europe, central and east Europeans are poor, but compared with the
populations of some African and Asian states, they are relatively
well off. Central and east European problems are very different from
those in underdeveloped states and should be treated as such.
Brundtland's reference to "socia^and cultural development" is not
relevant to CEE (except as it applies to the development of
democratic institutions) and would probably be construed by
Hungarians, Czechs, Poles and others as insulting. However,
Brundtland's reference to "unification of economics and ecology in
decision-making at all levels" is extremely relevant to CEE, as it is
the polar opposite of policy there prior to 1989.53
Robert Costanza, who in his quest to define sustainable
development differentiates between the disciplines of conventional
ecology, conventional economics and ecological economics, identifies
sustainable development as "a relationship between dynamic human
economic systems and larger dynamic, but normally slower-changing
ecological systems, in which, a) human life can continue
indefinitely; b) human individuals can flourish; c) human cultures
can develop; but in which d) effects of human activities remain
within bounds, so as not to destroy the diversity, complexity and
function of the ecological life-support system.54 Writing in the
post-Brundtland, pre-UNCED year of 1991, Costanza accepts as real the
struggle between economic growth and sustainability, yet advocates
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the "integrative synthesis" of economics and ecology, and urges an 
end to viewing the two as conflicting f o r c e s . 55
Costanza's view is that ecological economics is the integrative 
synthesis of conventional ecology and conventional economics.56 
While conventional ecology concerns itself primarily with the 
unwanted byproducts of production, conventional economics focuses on 
growth rather than sustainability, and "is very optimistic about the 
ability of technology ultimately to remove all resource constraints 
to continued economic g r o w t h . "57 Ecological economics, the fusion of 
the two, views nature as the economy's life-support system and humans 
as an important component in that system because they have the power 
to manage it for sustainability. Organizations, institutions and 
technology play a fundamental role in the process. If development is 
"an improvement in the quality of life without necessarily causing an 
increase in quantity of resources consumed," then sustainable 
development is possible, while sustainable growth is not.5# Many 
definitions of sustainable development seem to be inspired by the 
urgent need to address the problems of the world's poor: hunger, 
disease and poverty. Not addressed directly is poverty of a 
different sort -- that which was brought on by the collapse of the 
Soviet-style command economy system. While hunger may not 
necessarily be an issue in CEE, poverty and quality of life, as 
measured by health indicators, a r e . 59 in CEE, just as in states such 
as the UK, US, Ethiopia and Bangladesh, economic problems and 
environmental problems are linked. Costanza's approach to 
sustainable development seems to go beyond the Brundtland approach 
(which though it can be applied to CEE has a mostly Third-World 
slant) to a more general approach directly integrating economics and 
ecology. In that sense. Costanza's sustainable development 
definition is useful for understanding the challenges CEE faces both 
in rehabilitating its environment and in preventing future 
degradation.
Sustainable development is a useful theory for viewing 
environmental problems in a global, analytical way, but seems to have 
some difficulty inspiring enthusiasm on the community level. Ivan 
Gyulai, an environmental activist since the 1970s and director of the 
Ecological Institute for Sustainable Development (EISD) in Borsod 
County, Hungary -- a highly industrialized and heavily polluted 
region -- has become cynical about sustainable development as
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political priorities in the newly democratic state turn to economic 
development and away from environmental concerns. "I used to be 
enthusiastic about sustainable development. Now I am not so 
enthusiastic. Solidarity and cooperation [requirements for achieving 
sustainable development] are lies because they are not the nature of 
the people. You can't set up big events like the Rio summit... such 
conferences consist of too much general talk. People have to act and 
do something for their own c o m m u n i t i e s . " 7 0  Unless governments enact 
policies to protect the environment and provide funding for 
environmental research and cleanup projects, sustainable development 
will not have an impact on the lives of ordinary people. The 
Brundtland report itself states, "in the final analysis, sustainable 
development must rest on political w i l l . " 7 1  Thus regardless of what 
is declared or discussed at international conferences, the key to 
achieving sustainable development lies with states themselves: If 
enforcement of environmental laws is lax, and the drafting of new 
laws a low priority, as has been the case in such states as Hungary, 
action at the community level will falter.
1.3 THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS AND THE ZERO-PRICE PHENOMENON
With CEE presently in a state o^ varying degrees of 
environmental degradation and rehabilitation, the concept of 
sustainable development helps provides a framework for planning 
future development that won't negatively impact the environment. If 
sustainable development helps us to plan for the future, another 
theory is needed to help us to understand how states have allowed 
their environments to be degraded, a situation that is not limited to 
any one region or to any one era. The Tragedy of the Commons theory, 
originated by Hardin in 1968, seeks to provide an explanation for how 
and why humans allow problems such as pollution and depletion of 
natural resources to o c c u r , 72
Hardin used the metaphor of a shared pasture for grazing 
animals to illustrate his point.
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that 
each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on 
the commons, Such an arrangement may work reasonably 
satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and 
disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below 
the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes
the day of reckoning ... 73
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At this point, Harding says, the inherent logic of the commons 
generates the tragedy. The herdsman can add an animal to his herd in 
the commons and receive a positive utility of nearly plus one, as he 
can then receive all the proceeds from the sale of that animal; or, 
he can refrain from adding to the herd. The negative aspect of him 
adding an animal to the commons is equal to the negative effects of 
that amount of overgrazing on the common land. To the .herdsman, the 
negative utility of adding an animal to the commons is only a 
fraction of minus one. The tragedy occurs when many or all of the 
herdsmen acting in their own interests opt to add an animal. Under 
such circumstances the negative effect on the land would be 
considerable. Harding pinpoints freedom in the commons as its own 
worst e n e m y . 74 "Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit— in a world that is limited. Ruin is 
the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons bring ruin to all. "'^ 5
While Harding primarily address population issues, he also 
mentions pollution as a fitting example of this phenomenon. With 
pollution, however, it is the question not of taking something out of 
the commons, but putting something into it that doesn't belong there; 
for instance, radioactive waste, sewage and noxious fumes.76 Harding 
suggests that with pollution, society has institutionalized a 
permissiveness that favors dumping waste into the air, water or soil 
rather than purifying it first. "The rational man finds that his 
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is 
less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. 
...We are locked into a system of 'fouling our own nest,' so long as 
we behave only as independent, rational free-enterprisers."77 
Harding proposes coercive measures such as laws or taxing devices to 
make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to 
discharge them untreated.7&
Harding urges the formulation of "definite social arrangements" 
(such as laws) to prevent the abuse of common areas.79 Because the 
morality of an act depends on when and where and under what societal 
conditions it was performed, certain behavior such as dumping toxic 
waste from a factory into a nearby river is only bad if it is thought 
to be bad.80 Thus in certain political systems regulations are 
passed to prohibit toxic dumping, or if not prohibit, limit it; while
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in others, such as the centrally planned economies of CEE, dumping 
continued unabated. A parallel example of legislating limits on the 
commons is the issue of tax evasion, with the commons being the 
public coffers. If evading taxes is not perceived as bad in a 
certain society, people will continue to avoid paying in pursuit of 
their own financial gain with little sense of remorse. If, however, 
society deems it wrong to evade taxes, laws and other coercive 
measures are enforced to punish those to fail to p a y . 8 1  Though 
Harding advocates the restriction of freedoms under certain 
circumstances such as overpopulation (restricting the right to 
breed), he stresses that often the closing in of the commons can be a 
form of f r e e d o m . 82 Multilateral treaties signed in recent years on 
ozone depletion, Antarctica and outer space, for example, set 
guidelines to penalize polluters who breach certain environmental 
guidelines, assuring the protection of those commons for the good of 
all.
Since Harding's essay on the Tragedy of the Commons in 1968, 
restrictions on the commons such as the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) 
have been employed in industrialized economies. PPP is a general term 
referring to policy mechanisms which require the polluter to take 
responsibility for the cost of pollution via charges, taxes and 
compensation. 83 Tradable carbon emisMon permits are one tactic to
make the polluter pay for damage inflicted on the environment. The
permit system is market-based, and flexible in that it allows permit
holders to trade the right to emit carbon for finance or for any
other tradable items such as food or military equipment. The
interchange is left up to the permit holders themselves, with
direction by local governments. Because the permits are issued to 
the potential polluters themselves, the system avoids the difficult 
problem of determining national targets. One proposal for initial 
allocation of permits would be to distribute them on the basis of 
population, the theory being that every human has an equal right to 
use the atmospheric resource. Those who exceed their entitlement 
would be expected to pay. Thus the industrialized countries with 
high energy consumption could end up procuring extra permits from 
developing countries in exchange for technical assistance or some 
other product or service.84
The theory of the commons is a useful foundation for
understanding the situation in CEE prior to 1989. The Pearce Report
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argues that the underlying reason for environmental degradation is 
that many natural resources are treated, like the common herding 
ground, as if they are f r e e . 85 a market economy where no price is 
affixed to clean air, an intact ozone layer and clean soil, the cost 
to industry and individuals of degrading those resources is zero. To 
state it another way, no marketplace exists in market economies where 
the value and benefits of many natural resources can be bought and 
sold. While crude oil is bought and sold, with its economic benefits 
in mind, other natural resources such as coastal wetlands and clean 
air are not. Outside the framework of a marketplace based on demand, 
supply and a pricing mechanism, a resource can end up depleted or 
abused as a result of strong demand and zero p r i c e . 86 Examples of 
this zero-price phenomenon range from the deterioration of common 
herding ground in the Harding example to deforestation and excessive 
CO2 emissions, both of which contribute to the effects of global 
warming. In the centrally planned economies of CEE, a similar 
dilemma existed. Just as in market economies, natural resources such 
as clean air, waterways and soil also had no price fixed to them, and 
ended up degraded in a way similar to market economies. However, in 
the centrally planned economies, environmental problems were 
exacerbated by the fact that energy sources also were not priced to 
reflect their value and scarcity; thi>s.. commodities such as crude oil 
were not bought and sold with their economic benefits in mind, 
resulting in undervaluing and overuse of natural resources and the 
accompanying effect on the e n v i r o n m e n t . 87
The Pearce Report suggests that one way to protect natural 
resources from degradation or depletion is to incorporate them into 
countries' national accounting systems, which can help to forecast 
future use and identify the environmental impact of such u s e . 88 F o r  
a given resource, the goals of environmental accounting are to 
identify what stocks are available, their sources and how those 
stocks can be added to or transformed over time. The accounting 
could also identify the uses of the r e s o u r c e . 89 in 1983, Williamson 
proposed a similar change in the way natural resources are accounted 
for.90 Williamson argued that oil sales could, or should, be 
regarded as "capital depreciation," not income. Thus conceptually 
correct accounting would treat the depletion of oil reserves in the 
ground on a par with the depletion of produced capital goods. "This 
would mean that the overwhelming part of oil revenue would not
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qualify as a part of net domestic product, although it does of course 
contribute to GDP."91 An accounting system such as the one described 
could aid in the fair evaluation of oil countries' national incomes, 
which have been grossly exaggerated relative to that of industrial
countries.92
The fusion of the concepts of sustainable development and the 
Tragedy of the Commons provides a more refined and accurate picture 
of environmental degradation than either theory on its own. 
Sustainable development, as a framework for future development, helps 
us to think critically about patterns of economic activity which 
won't degrade the environment. The theory of the commons, which 
highlights some destructive patterns of natural resource use, allows 
us to learn from the failure of governments to place restrictions on 
use and abuse of resources. Examination of the primary international 
relations theories will provide additional framework in seeking to 
understand how CEE ended up in its present environmental state, and 
what kind of activities may be necessary to aid the region on its 
path to more sustainable development.
1.4 THE ENVIRONMENT IN CEE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
International relations theory,^ along with the environmental 
theories addressed above, provides the necessary critical tools with 
which to address some critical issues regarding the environmental 
situation in the transitional economies of CEE. While Chapter 2 will 
provide the empirical data necessary to understanding the situation, 
this section will detail various ways to view some of the key 
questions facing the region: To what extent do the environmental
problems in the former East bloc complicate their transitions to 
market economies? How will these states clean up their environments 
and make the necessary changes toward sustainable development? What 
kind of outside guidance and assistance are they receiving? All of 
these issues to a greater or lesser extent involve more than one 
actor, including international organizations, industry, NGOs, and, in 
particular, states. How we define and analyze the interaction 
between these various actors depends on the problem at hand and also 
on the way we choose to view the various actors. For instance, are 
states inclined to cooperate with one another, or are they compelled 
to cooperate because of the nature of the issues involved? A survey
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of three primary international relations theories -- realism, 
pluralism and structuralism -- will highlight the various ways of 
answering this question.
Realism
Events of the past two decades--the Stockholm Conference on the 
Human Environment, UNCED, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone 
Depleting Substances, and other international agreements--challenge 
the realist conception of international relations, which maintains 
that the balance of power between states is the primary determinant 
of security and prosperity. Theorists who subscribe to the realist 
paradigm see the world as consisting of distinct, mutually exclusive 
states. Largely a product of the two world wars and the subsequent 
tension between the superpowers, realist theory focuses on states as 
"rational maximizers of power in an anarchic system."93 Realism also 
holds that some states have more power than others in a decentralized 
international system of sovereign states. In this framework, 
domestic politics is considered separate from foreign p o l i c y . 9 4
Hans Morgenthau's contribution to realism includes the 
proposition that political relationships are governed by objective 
rules rooted in human nature, and that statesmen "think and act in 
terms of interest defined as power." Sovereign states must vie for 
that power, with survival being the minimum goal of foreign policy. 
Morgenthau's view incorporates a hierarchical prioritization of 
issues; once the state's survival is assured, the nation-state may 
pursue less pressing p r o b l e m s . 95 George Kennan, another realist, 
follows Morgenthau's line of thinking in that he views human nature 
as an underlying force in international relations. Kennan believes 
that humans are basically selfish and obstinate, with a tendency 
toward violence. During the Cold War, Kennan was doubtful that 
organizations such as the United Nations had the ability to resolve 
East-West problems. Regarding problems of international pollution, 
Kennan proposed that "leading industrial and maritime nations--the 
nations which created the most serious problems of pollution, which 
had the resources to study the problem, and which had it in their 
power to remedy most of the evils in question" should take the 
initiative toward resolution of ecological d i l e m m a s . 9 6
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Regarding the proposition that unilateral action is the only 
determinant of a state's security and prosperity, consider a 
hypothetical proposal by domestic environmental groups that the UK 
radically cut ozone-depleting emissions. If the UK were to take 
action and the other industrialized powers did not, the overall 
impact on the environment would be minimal. Furthermore, because of 
the potential negative effects cutting emissions might' have its 
industrial competitiveness, it would not make rational sense for the 
UK to take unilateral action to cut emissions without agreement by 
other countries to do the same. If unilateral action to cut 
emissions were to take place, its impact would more likely be felt in 
its negative effect on the UK's position in the world trading system 
rather than on measured global emissions levels.
Transboundary environmental forces such as the pollution of 
shared waterways or air demonstrate that states are distinct, 
sovereign entities only in situations over which they have control. 
Many natural resources transcend national boundaries, and weaker 
states have just as much power to pollute or degrade the environment 
as powerful states. For instance, though countries in South East 
Asia depend on cutting down trees for a significant portion of their 
incomes, they can use deforestation as leverage in disputes on global 
warming and biodiversity: They can 'agree to scale back deforestation
only on the condition that General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) restrictions favoring more prosperous countries in semi­
manufactured goods be e a s e d . 97 Viewing states as "rational 
maximizers of power in an anarchic system" willing to use force as an 
effective instrument of foreign policy has its applications in 
certain situations, particularly when applied to the tension between 
the US and Iraq in the years following the Gulf War, or to the 
superpower arms buildup in the post World War II period. However, 
Keohane and Nye maintain that, when applied to ecological problems 
such as deforestation and transboundary pollution, the use of force 
by one state (or group of states) against another would be largely 
irrational, as it would have costly effects on non-security g o a l s . 9 8
Because the environment is a system of shared natural 
resources, degradation of one country's air or water means 
degradation for its neighbors. Thus pressure from environmental 
groups targeted at improving a country's domestic policies often 
translate into the country's policy toward other countries, a
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contradiction of the realist proposition that domestic policy and 
foreign policy are separate. In Hungary in 1989, pressure by 
Hungarian environmental groups, economists and engineers over a 
hydroelectric dam project led to a decision by Hungary to discontinue 
work on the p r o j e c t . 99 Problems arose because Czechoslovakia, which 
was working on another aspect of the project, had already completed 
much of its share at great expense. Hungary's action led to tension 
with Austria and Czechoslovakia over financing: Austrian companies, 
which had agreed to underwrite most of the Hungarian construction 
costs in exchange for future deliveries of electricity to be 
generated by the project, demanded compensation, and Prague demanded 
that Hungary complete its portion of the project or compensate 
Czechoslovakia $500 m i l l i o n . ^00
During the time that Czechoslovakia was splitting in two, the 
line between domestic concerns and foreign policy became blurred in 
Slovakia as well as in Hungary. In October 1992, Slovakia, whose 
territory bordered the dam project, began diverting water from the 
the Danube for its hydroelectric dam system at Gabcikovo. The 
diversion of the Danube waters turned the former river into a virtual 
creek along a 25-kilometer stretch of borderlands between Slovakia 
and Hungary. Completion of the dam by thé Slovaks, which happened to
coincide with a national election, had became synonymous with the new
republic's pride and independence. As Slovakia's first foreign
policy move, the diversion appeared to be a statement of its
strength, will and decisiveness. Slovakia's move to divert the 
Danube left Hungary shocked, and prompted it to turn to international 
organizations for help.^Ol
One aspect of the realist paradigm which does seem to 
incorporate environmental dilemmas involves geopolitics. The extent 
to which nations will go in order to secure natural resources--the 
Falklands War, the Gulf War, and centuries of colonial expansion by 
the European powers--is evidence that a state's physical resource 
base is a fundamental element of its aggregate power. Rowlands 
maintains that "the exploitation of natural resources allows a state 
to meet the basic needs of its peoples, to build up its economic and 
industrial base, and to prepare for w a r . "402 The Brundtland report 
predicted: "Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources 
become scarcer and competition for them i n c r e a s e s . " 403
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The realist paradigm's general inadequacy in dealing with the 
analysis and resolution of global environmental problems is 
inadvertently addressed in the Brundtland report's suggestion that 
national interests should be put aside in favor of c o o p e r a t i o n . 404 
Susskind and Ozawa, writing in The International Politics of the 
Environment, suggest that new arrangements are needed among 
international organizations to ensure formal linkages .between 
environmental protection and development planning. In other words, 
states and international organizations need to do more to implement 
the goals of the Brundtland C o m m i s s i o n . 405
Pluralism
Theories of international relations which encompass a more 
pluralistic approach allow more scope within which to examine 
environmental problems and the politics surrounding them. Just as 
power is the primary analytical tool of realist theory, 
interdependence is the primary tool of pluralistic theory.
Pluralism, which is largely as a critique of realist theory in the 
19 60s and 70s, emerged in a world characterized by the proliferation 
of multinational corporations, gl^ obal communications, international 
trade and the growth of supranational organizations set up to achieve 
peace and p r o s p e r i t y . 406 Keohane and Nye define interdependence as 
mutual dependence, and interdependence in world politics as 
situations characterized by "reciprocal effects" among countries or 
among actors in different c o u n t r i e s . 407 These reciprocal effects are 
not necessarily symmetrical, and, in order to be considered 
interdependent, the result of interaction between actors must be 
costly. Keohane and Nye maintain that in the case of the 
environment, some costly effects do not necessarily come directly or 
intentionally from other actors. They add that collective action may 
be necessary to protect an ecological system threatened by 
pollution.408
Interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of 
states, but the actions of governments also influence patterns of 
interdependence, and often affects the sensitivity of one actor to 
disruption of a situation by another actor.409 As described earlier, 
the OPEC oil crisis in the early 1970s was a classic example of an 
interdependent situation for which import-dependent countries paid
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dearly. Japan, which was heavily dependent on foreign oil for its 
energy needs, was more vulnerable than the US during the crisis. Yet 
the US still suffered long queues for petrol, rationing and general 
disruption. Had the US had the time and domestic support to implement 
an aggressive conservation policy after the first oil shock in 1971, 
it might have been less sensitive to later shocks in 1973 and
1975.440
Keohane and Nye construct an "ideal type": complex
interdependence. They contend that though complex interdependence is 
the a critique of realism, it manages to come closer to reality.411 
One of the main characteristics of complex interdependence is that 
societies are connected by multiple channels:
These channels can be summarized as interstate, 
transgovernmental and transnational relations. Interstate 
relations are the noi^ mal channels assumed by realists. 
Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist assumption 
that states act coherently as units; transnational applies 
when we relax the assumption that states are the only units.
A second tenet of complex interdependence is that issues applying to
interstate relationships do not fall into a clear hierarchy. Thus
military security issues do not necessarily take precedence over
domestic issues. A third characteristic is that in a region where
complex interdependence prevails^-military force is not used by
governments toward other governments'within the region. However, the
use of force outside the region is possible and sometimes necessary,
particularly against a rival b l o c . 413
Just as states are the actors in the realist framework, in a
pluralistic framework, governments, international governmental
organizations (IGOs; the EU or UN) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs; Greenpeace) are the actors. Rather than pursuing their
separate national interests through power politics or the use of
military force, governments or groups in the pluralistic framework
negotiate or bargain in an effort to manage problems that affect more
than one actor. Examples of such negotiation include the Uruguay
Round of the GATT and the UN Conference on Environment and
Development.414
Such multilateral collaboration as can be seen in organizations 
such as the UN and EU are described in international relations as 
"functionalist." Functionalism, a theory of political integration 
within the pluralistic framework, eventually would envisage
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organizations for functional collaboration as possibly superseding 
the political institutions of the state. Mitrany, a theorist who 
wrote between the two world wars and thereafter, suggested that 
functionalism evolved as a result of the increasing complexity of 
governmental systems. This complexity had increased the essentially 
technical, less political tasks facing governments, leading to a need 
for highly trained specialists at the national and international 
levels. Mitrany saw functional collaboration among technicians, not 
political elites, as necessary to solving new and emerging problems
of modern s o c i e t y . 415
Jacobson establishes several reasons why states create 
international organizations: to provide information for members, to 
create norms or standards of conduct, to create rules (either binding 
or non-binding), to create a supervisory authority (such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency) and to provide program or 
services to members (such as human health or relief activities).146 
Imber states that one of functionalism's central premises is the 
assumption that there are public goods in international society which 
require some form of international organization to administer 
them.417 Porter and Welsh Brown maintain that global environmental
politics "involve interactions aB^ng non-state actors transcending a 
single r e g i o n . "418 UN agencies proyide the mechanism for states to 
engage in such interaction. Imber writes in 1989:
The environmental agenda presents the clearest challenge to 
the ability of the [UN] agencies to fulfil needs that are 
urgent and genuinely universal. Global warming, ozone 
depletion and toxic waste dumping are issues that will test 
the commitment and patience of the members... through the 
1990s and beyond.119
Yet to inspire cooperation and diplomacy requires a pre-existing
peace -- a state of being which serves the notion that functionalism
is indeed a stark contrast to r e a l i s m . 1^9
John Garnett, in a critique of realism, points out that the
state's power has been diminished by the presence of international
organizations. "At the end of the day the economic success of the
United Kingdom probably depends on decisions taken by OPEC or the
EEC, the Uruguay round of GATT, exchange rates, and, above all, a
peaceful trading e n v i r o n m e n t ."121 Garnett asserts that vertically
structured states are ill-equipped to handle a whole range of new
global problems, among them the environment. Crippled by a
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traditional "mind-set," these states "are much more comfortable when 
they are contending with familiar power political issues than they 
are with global p r o b l e m s . "122 case in point: the Gulf War and its 
subsequent tensions. Saddam Hussein is a much more tangible (and, 
some might argue, more manageable) problem than global warming.123 
The development of functionalism as an approach to 
international relations parallels the evolution of multinational 
efforts to aid developing countries. Functionalism was partially 
based on the premise that peace was dependent upon the conquest of 
poverty, ignorance and backwardness. Resolution of these problems 
require resources and creativity across national boundaries as well 
as within s t a t e s . 424 The UN's role as an umbrella to such agencies 
as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations International Children's Fund 
serves these p u r p o s e s . 425 u n e p, mandated by the Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment, functions as a research and negotiating 
forum for the protection of the global environment. UNEP provided a 
forum for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
and the subsequent Montreal Protocol, and its Inter-governmental 
Panel on Climate Change serves as an expert working group on global 
w a r m i n g . 426 international non-goVernmental organizations (INGOs) are 
also involved in multilateral effortes ..to resolve problems. INGOs are 
formed by private citizens, or groups of citizens, from three or more 
countries. Greenpeace, the International Committee for the Red Cross 
and Amnesty International are examples of INGOs that work to mobilize 
public opinion, by, for instance, publicizing severe environmental 
degradation or human rights a b u s e s . 427
The ability of international organizations to resolve 
environmental problems and disputes can, however, be limited.
Natural resources such as air and water are indivisible, and selfish 
behavior by just a few countries can jeopardize the group's effort at 
an agreement. No international pact, whether binding or non-binding, 
can in the long-term guarantee Bangladesh protection from rising sea 
levels. Ensuring compliance to international agreements involves the 
willingness of participating members to impose sanctions and 
penalties. Furthermore, the formation of an international 
organization by one region may not necessarily guarantee benefits for 
another region, as the two may have starkly different priorities. 
International trade regimes favoring certain trading blocs is a good
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example of such discriminatory "cooperation." The GATT has been 
accused of favoring the North by failing to act on, for instance, the
dumping of European agricultural surplus on development s t a t e s . 428
Structural ism
Another approach to international relations which some may view 
as having particular relevance for the economic and environmental 
future of central Europe, is structuralism. In the 19 60s and 70s, 
structural theories took shape as an outgrowth of Marxist thinking on 
inequality and as a critique of realist theory's failure to 
incorporate economics as a key deterministic element. The 
inequitable structure of the world economy is the lens through which 
structuralists see the w o r l d . 429 They maintain that some countries, 
or economies, are conditioned in their development by their
dependence on other countries or economies, and that this dependency
is structural. Structuralists argue that the Western pattern of 
industrialization as a route to development is not necessarily the 
best path, and that the mere existence of Western capitalist 
economies prevents poorer countries from developing on that m o d e l . 43 0 
Dependencia, a Latin American vi^w of such inequality, emphasizes 
that the region's role as a supplier of primary products to the 
industrialized world put Latin America at a disadvantage because the 
terms of trade were moving over the long term against primary 
products. A.G. Frank, an early dependencia writer, held that surplus 
is extracted from the poorer agrarian countries on the periphery and 
transferred to the richer industrialized countries in the core, 
creating structural development and underdevelopment. Frank believed 
that attempts by those on the periphery to achieve development could 
only succeed by severing the bonds which tied their region to the 
capitalist world system.431
Emmanuel Wallerstein, who uses a world systems approach to 
explain structural inequality, divides the global economy into a core 
(rich industrialized states), periphery (poor, raw-material producing 
states) and semi-periphery (a hybrid of the core and periphery).132 
In this framework, politics and social behavior are second to 
international economic relations. Wallerstein explains colonialism 
as an economic phenomenon undertaken to procure sources of raw 
materials. In this international division of labor, core states
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dominate the production of manufactured commodities, selling them for 
profit in the world market. The resulting wealth has been used over 
several centuries to establish the most powerful states in the world 
economy. "The existence of powerful state structures enabled the 
dominant classes in the core to impose their will on weaker societies 
which were adjacent to, and subsequently became part of, the 
capitalist world e c o n o m y . "433 The peripheral regions,, by contrast, 
specialize in low-income generating agricultural and mining 
activities. Because of their subordinate status in the world 
economic system, these states are vulnerable to changes in the world 
economy. Their lack of income limits their power to change their 
status in the international division of labor. States in the semi­
periphery have characteristics of both the core and periphery, with 
their economic status often in a state of transition. The semi­
periphery states are exploited by the core, but in turn exploit the 
periphery. Countries do not necessarily have the same status 
forever; empires rise and fall, as we have seen in the decline of the 
British manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s .434
In emphasizing economics as the key determinant of 
international relations, Wallerstein questions the very legitimacy of 
the state. He maintains that the^^tate's development coincided with 
the birth of the world capitalist system, and that it developed for 
capitalism. He traces the origin of the state to the 16th century 
and the failure of the Habsburgs to create a world empire, after 
which capitalism took hold and established itself. A recession a 
century later consolidated the European world economy, and the 
decreased surplus of goods left only one core state--England-- 
s u r v i v i n g .435 Wallerstein explains inevitable shifts in economic 
status through the assertion that the world capitalist structure has 
a determining effect on the behavior of actors within it, and that 
the structure may constrain some states while enabling others. The 
mercantilist period was characterized by the shifting of the 
Netherlands out of the "core" and by England's efforts to resist 
French efforts to catch up with it. As industrial capitalism took 
over in the 19th century, the strength of a few states grew, but 
regions such as Latin America were left on the periphery of the world 
economy, and countries such as Russia on the semi-periphery. By the 
187 0s, England had declined as the core state in the world economy, 
the US rose to core status, and Russia had descended toward the
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p e r i p h e r y . 436 The economic power held by the core states is crucial
for states on the periphery because the core has the ability to
protect its markets from foreign competition, as well as control the
amount of financial capital which flows into developing countries
either through loans or direct a i d . 437 the case of the countries
of CEE--which in 199 0 found themselves on the edge of the the world
economy--foreign capital inflows and the gradual opening up of
markets in the core will be a crucial ticket to joining the core
states of Europe. The region's environmental rehabilitation, which
can only follow such market adjustments, is thus similarly dependent
on such outside assistance. Structural approaches to international
relations also highlight the possibility that such outside
"assistance" to CEE could take the form of exploitation. As the
countries of CEE are integrated into the world economy, they could
find themselves being utilized for their cheap labor, not for their
human resources. Another concern is that countries lacking a
developed environmental protection infrastructure (largely the norm)
could be used as a locale for dirty Western industry, as Mexico has
been in the past. Thus states CEE, though in some ways well on their
way to joining the core (Hungary, Poland and others have
Association Agreements with the EU) ,' could also be in danger of beingXtreated like states on the traditional periphery.
In The Greening of a Red, MacEwan puts his finger on what he 
considers to be likely exploitation of CEE in coming years. In the 
context of a discussion of the events following the 1989 democratic 
revolutions, he writes:
All the Western businessmen could think about, as they 
hovered like vultures over the 'corpse' of 'socialism, ' was 
how to lay their greedy hands on Eastern Europe, frankly 
regarded as the 'new Korea' in which cheap skilled labour 
offers capital an exceptional rate of profit. 'Freedom' was 
on everybody's lips, but the freedom that interested the 
fifty billionaires who control the Western European 
financial world was freedom to operate in an expanding
m a r k e t . 4 3  8
In this context, the states of CEE are not the stereotypical raw- 
material producing countries of the periphery, but a whole new breed 
of dependent states.
On the other hand, the "dependency" situation referred to by 
structuralists can be viewed from the point of view that CEE's future 
development, and environmental rehabilitation, cannot progress
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without help from outside. Hungarian government officials, for 
instance, have no qualms about admitting they would be lost without 
Western investment. Denes Olessak, head of the Division for 
Environmental Protection and Safety at the Hungarian Ministry of 
Industry, asserts: "This is a little country. We have had some 
success on our own, but really we are w e a k . "439 In fact, one of the 
criticisms about Western involvement from a Hungarian perspective is 
that not enough money is being invested in solid projects. Foreign 
involvement in the transitions of the CEE states, it seems, is 
inevitable. Whether that is a good or a bad thing is a matter of 
opinion.
Suxmnary
All three primary international relations theories -- realism, 
pluralism and structuralism -- provide a useful framework for 
understanding environmental politics. Realism, though it does not 
stress cooperation, a major feature of environmental politics in the 
past 20 years, provides a sobering lesson that must not be forgotten: 
CEE states are primarily concerned with their own interests. 
Regardless of international conferences and agreements, states in the 
former East bloc have more on their''minds than achieving sustainable 
development, namely attracting investment, reducing foreign debt and 
creating jobs. That said, pluralist theories of international 
relations provide insight into a future which may well be 
characterized by international cooperation. Pluralism's emphasis on 
interdependence is an important basis for understanding the 
motivations behind collective action, which international treaties on 
the environment have proven can be achieved. Treaties such as the 
1974 Helsinki Convention on Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea Area are testament to the fact that cooperation and 
negotiation work. Finally, structuralist theories, with their 
emphasis on economics and inequality, are useful for determining the 
intentions of foreign investment and aid in the former East bloc 
economies. However, the eagerness of CEE officials, and even 
environmental g r o u p s , 440 receive help from the West may discount
this application of structuralist theory. Sustainable development, 
the theory of the commons and the above international relations 
theories will provide a framework for understanding how the states of
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CEE ended up in their present environmental condition and what sort 
of action may need to be taken in the future. Chapter 2 will provide 
details on environmental degradation in the region, the health 
situation, and an explanation of aspects of the command economy 
system which may have contributed to the region’s environmental 
problems.
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cabapter 2
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
AND THE COMMAND ECONOMY
2.1 POLLUTION AND STATE SELF-INTEREST: FOCUS ON HUNGARY
As discussed above, the conventional realist conception of 
international relations views international politics and domestic 
politics as two separate entities, but this means of interpreting 
international behavior is contradicted by events in CEE such as the 
Hungarian-Slovakian water disputes.4 However, the realist paradigm 
does contain one key point, which on its own can help us to 
understand why states degrade their environments at the expense of 
other states which are forced to share the same air and water.
Realism maintains that states tend to act in their own self-interest, 
not only in relations with other states but also in domestic policy­
making .2 Thus if a state has what it perceives to be powerful enough 
reasons to sacrifice environmental quality in order to achieve high 
industrial output, it can do just that, despite the language adopted 
at both the StockholnC Conference on the Human Environment and at 
UNCED. If ideological and strategic priorities call £or the 
formation of a high-output economy with heavy emphasis on metallurgy 
and arms manufacturing, priorities may be such that protecting the 
environment from those industries is at the bottom of the society's 
political agenda. The conscious decision of a government not to 
regulate emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, for 
example, or not to control the types of vehicles driven (such as 
those with highly polluting two-stroke engines), may ultimately 
contribute to the degradation of the global environment as well as 
the state's environment. Thus one state's self-interested actions 
contributing to the degradation of the ozone layer or to global 
warming force other states to suffer. When a state on the receiving 
end protests, as Hungary did with Slovakia's diversion of the Danube 
in 1992, what starts out as a domestic issue suddenly turns into an 
international dispute.3
The goal of this chapter is to show that the degradation of the 
environment in CEE did not occur as a result of economic desperation, 
as has been the case in some underdeveloped states, but rather as a
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result of self-interested government policies originating in or 
inspired by the Soviet Union, In contrast to some African states, 
where the need to pay back international loans has forced 
overcultivation of the land, resulting in desertification and famine, 
in the former Soviet satellites prior to 1989 environmental 
degradation occurred as the result of conscious government decisions 
to emphasize heavy industry, which sacrificed environmental quality 
for high output.^  In the 1980s, CEE environmental movements, as one 
of the only forms of political protest tolerated under the political 
regimes, played a key role in drawing attention to decades of 
environmental degradation.^ However, now that economies in the 
region are seeking to move toward market-oriented systems, economic 
hardship has surpassed the environment as a concern, again pushing 
the environment down the list of priorities.^
This chapter will, through an analysis of empirical data and 
government documents, seek to show that central and eastern Europe 
has high levels of pollution, and that the region has contributed 
disproportionately to global air pollution levels. Air pollution, 
which is easier to measure than other types of environmental 
degradation, will be emphasized because of its transboundary, and 
thus international relations, implications. Figure 2.1 shows the 
disproportionate amount of sulfur emissions exported from Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the former East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
the former Yugoslavia compared with imports of airborne sulfur into 
their territories. When possible, the data in this chapter will 
emphasize comparisons with industrialized and more prosperous Western 
states. While data on the entire CEE region will be presented, the 
analysis will zone in on Hungary, a state whose worst environmental 
problem is air pollution.7
Hungary's geographical location in the center of Europe 
positions it both as a potential gateway to the east and as an 
exporter of air pollution. Having made attempts at economic reform 
during its years in the Soviet bloc, Hungary gained the reputation of 
being one of the more prosperous and moderate regimes in the region; 
its efforts at economic reform in the 1960s and 1970s included 
periods of less rigorously applied Soviet command economy principles 
than were found in other parts of CEE.^ During the New Economic 
Mechanism reform effort in the 1960s, notable aspects of the
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FIGURE 2.1
Transboundary Pollution in Central Europe, 1987
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source: Adapted from data in "Em issions are falling ...but is it enough?" Acid 
M agazine (Septem ber 9, 1989), p. 5
Stalinist system--central planning in quantitative units and the 
centralized allocation of resources--were abandoned entirely for a 
period.9 Since then it has been perceived as one of the more 
Westernized and culturally accessible states in the region. In the 
1970s and particularly the 1980s, selected areas of public protest,
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environmentalism in particular, were tolerated, which is more than 
was seen in such countries as Romania under Ceaucescu.^^ Yet in 
spite of all that, in 1989, the last year of the old regime, it still 
had thirty times the sulfur dioxide emissions per dollar of GNP than 
France (see table 2 . 1 ) Thus even one of the most moderate CEE 
command systems, both economically and politically, had emissions 
levels far disproportionate to its output.
Table 2.1 Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 1989
Total emissions 
(000 metric tons 
S02/year)Country
Central Europe & USSR Albania (a) 50Bulgaria 1,030Czechoslovakia 
Germany (Dem Rep)Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia USSR (b)
800 210 218 910 200 1,650 9,318
\
Per Capita
Emissions
(kilograms)
15.6 114.6 178 .9 
313^3115.2103.3 
8.6
69.6 32.4
Emissions per 
Dollar GNP 
(grams)
13.249.422.7
32.7 
45.058.42.5 27.93.5
Western Europe & US Austria 124Belgium 414
France 1,520German (Fed Rep) 1,500Italy 2,410Sweden 220United Kingdom 3,552United States (c) 20,700
16.341.527.124.2
41.925.9 62.183.2
Sources: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-93: A Guide to the Global 
Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 64. Items extracted by the 
authors from Chapter 24, "Atmosphere and Climate," Table 24.5, and Chapter 15, "Basic 
Economic Indicators," Table 15.1, as well as unpublished data from the World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., June 1991.
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Table 2.1 Nitrogen Oxide Emissions, 1989
(cent'd)
Total emissions 
(000 metric tons 
N02/year)
Per Capita
Emissions
(kilograms]
Emissions per 
Dollar GNP 
(grams)Country
Central Europe & USSR Albania (a) 9Bulgaria 150Czechoslovakia 950Germany (Dem Rep) 7 08Hungary 2 59
Poland 1/480Romania (a) 3 90Yugoslavia (a) 190USSR (b) 4,190
Western Europe & US Austria 211Belgium 297France 1.688German (Fed Rep) 3,000
Italy 1,700Sweden 3 01United Kingdom 2,513United States (c) 19,800
2166042
243916.88.014.6
27.729.8 30.148.429.635.443.979.6
22.14.93.21.6
X
Sources: World Resources Institute, p. 65. Items extracted by the authors from
Chapter 24, "Atmosphere and Climate," Table 24.5, and Chapter 15, "Basic Economic 
Indicators," Table 15.1, as well as unpublished data from the World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., June 1991.
Notes :
a. Estimated emissions.
b. Emissions data for European part of USSR only. Per capita and per dollar 
emissions calculated using population and GNP data for entire country.
c. 1988 emissions data.
Hungary has had more success than its neighbors in attracting 
badly needed investment for economic restructuring. The US Commerce 
Department's provisional estimate for total foreign direct investment 
in Hungary in 1993 was $5.5 billion, with US foreign direct 
investment amounting to $2.4 billion. By contrast, Poland had $3 
billion of total foreign direct investment in 1993, with $1 billion 
of that originating in the US. The Czech Republic's total foreign 
direct investment in 1993 was $568 million, with total US foreign
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direct investment $255 million of that total. 2^ The Commerce 
Department attributes Hungary's success at attracting investment to 
the country's efforts at quickly becoming a member of the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund, 
and allowing the US Chamber of Commerce to secure a presence in the 
early stages of the country's post-1989 transition to democracy and 
free markets.
Foreign interest in Hungary has gone beyond investment in 
economic restructuring; the country has aroused keen interest from 
the West, as well as Japan, in the area of environmental 
rehabilitation. The Regional Environmental Center for Central and 
Eastern Europe (REC) in Budapest, a non-profit information 
clearinghouse, was established in 1990 by Hungary, the US and the 
European Community, and is the focal point for many projects and 
proposals in the r e g i o n . T h e  location of the REC in Hungary is an 
interesting parallel to the high levels of investment in the country, 
and the origins of the REC's initial funding compare directly to the 
investment trends in Hungary: 20% of the Center's seed money came
from the US,^^ and the Center employs US Environmental Protection 
Agency officials through secondment s c h e m e s . Throughout
igovernment-sponsored environmental, activity in Hungary, evidence? of 
US influence is evident, both in government-to-government advisory 
services as well as in private c o n s u l t i n g . t h e  Hungarian economy 
moves toward privatization and economic restructuring, Hungarians 
have reciprocated the foreign interest with an interest in Western 
culture and goods.
Hungary's stability seems to be more a cultural characteristic
than a fleeting political phenomenon, as shown by the election in May
19 94, which elevated the Hungarian Socialist Party, some of whose 
members were prominent members of the pre-1989 Communist Party, to 
the majority party in the state Parliament. As the new government 
led by Gyula Horn takes hold, the expected jitters one would expect 
from the international investor community have failed to
materialize.18 Though the implications of the recent election are
still developing, one thing is clear: the public has become 
increasingly impatient with the reform process, but that is not 
particularly bothering Western investors. As can be seen all over 
CEE, the pressure of economic transformation has apparently proved 
great enough to send voters seeking comforts of the old system. What
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may be keeping investors in Hungary calm is, first, the willingness 
of the Socialists to form a coalition government with runner-up party 
Alliance of Free Democrats,1^ and second, the reality that economic 
restructuring is indeed painful: the election of a Socialist majority 
may simply be the manifestation of public sentiment that' the economic 
shock people are experiencing should be cushioned. From an 
environmental perspective, however, the election further drives home 
the point that the public's priorities include more jobs and better 
social services, among other things, and the environment as a major 
social problem has receded from the public mindset. Accompanying 
this change has been a distinct lack of political will to commit time 
and resources to ensuring the environment is cleaned up and economic 
growth is achieved in a sustainable m a n n e r . ^0
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND HUMAN HEALTH IN CEE
This section will survey environmental data on CEE prior to 
1990, when enterprises started to become dismantled and pollution 
levels subsided s o m e w h a t . It will also consider health statistics 
on the region, which have been widely perceived as being related to 
the environmental problems. Howler, few direct links will be made 
between environmental problems and Relatively poor health in CEE 
compared with Western Europe; even the World Health Organization is 
hesitant to do so, due to a variety of other factors such as work- 
related stress, high-fat diets, alcoholism, and a higher percentage 
of smokers, all of which inevitably have had an effect on the quality 
of health in the r e g i o n . T h i s  section will highlight possible 
causes of problems such as high sulfur emissions, but Section 2.3, 
"The command economy and its impact on the environment," will analyze 
in detail the economic system under which such conditions transpired. 
As part of the Hungarian case study, a review will be made of 
government publications such as the country's presentation to UNCED 
in 1992 and studies on air pollution.
Resource utilization and air pollution
The primary characteristics of the economies of Hungary and 
other CEE states which contributed to higher air pollution levels 
included the widespread use of less energy-efficient fuels and the
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employment of lower quality, often obsolete technology in industry.23 
Soviet oil did not become available to Eastern Europe until the early 
197 0s, so, while Western Europe was receiving cheap oil imports in 
the 1950s and 60s, central Europe was burning brown coal, or 
" l i g n i t e . "24 Domestic lignite, the primary fuel used in CEE, has a 
high ash content, a sulfur content that varies considerably from 
region to region (up to 5% in some areas, and as little as 0.7% in 
others) and an energy yield that may be only half that of hard 
coal.25 Thus more lignite has to be burned in order to meet a given 
energy demand, resulting in higher emissions of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrous oxides.26
The use of brown coal is responsible for much of the sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in CEE. Excessive amounts of 
sulfur-dioxide can cause acute, chronic respiratory diseases. SO2 is 
a main cause of acid rain, while nitrous oxides are significant 
contributors to global warming, or the "Greenhouse Effect,“ as well 
as to acid rain. Burning coal also produces high quantities of 
particulates, or dust, which reflect solar radiation and affect the 
Earth's thermal b a l a n c e . 27 East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
in particular, became especially dependent on low-quality domestic 
coal in the decades following Wo^ld War 11.28
Table 2.2, which shows commercial energy consumption in various 
countries in central Europe in 1989, indicates high dependence on 
solid fuels. Table 2.3 shows that 81% of coal used in Hungary in 1989 
was brown coal, while in the OECD Europe states, only 61% of coal 
used was brown coal, taking into consideration that sulfur contents 
in eastern Europe tend to be higher than in western E u r o p e . 2 9  The 
International Energy Agency in Paris reports that energy efficiency 
in CEE in 1985, 1989 and 1991 was significantly less than in the more 
developed OECD Europe (see table 2.4).28
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Table 2.2 Commercial Energy Consumption in Central Europe, 1989
Consumption (petajoules) (a)
Solid Liquid
Country Total Fuels(b) Fuels(c) Gas(d) Electricity
Albania 119 42 50 16 11
Bulgaria 1,291 662 355 238 36
Czechoslovakia 2,733 1,702 513 403 114
Germany (Dem Rep) 3,648 2,753 539 303 53
Hungary 1,136 306 313 427 90
Poland 5, 062 4,040 605 397 20
Romania 3,047 944 683 1,346 74
Yugoslavia 1,771 810 609 239 113
USSR 54,958 14,510 6,049 22,970 1,429
Consumption by Fuel Type as a % of Total
Solid Liquid
Country Fuels Fuels Gas Electricity
Albania 36 43 13 9
Bulgaria 51 28 18 3
Czechoslovakia 62 19 15 4
Germany (Dem Rep) 75 15 8 1
Hungary 27 28 K 38 8
Poland 80 12 ' 8 '0Romania 31 22 X 44 2
Yugoslavia 46 34 13 6
USSR 26 29 42 3
Source; United Nations Statistical Office, UN Energy Tape, United Nations,
New York, 1991.
Notes: a. Consumption is defined as domestic production plus net imports, minus 
net stock increases, minus aircraft and marine bunkers, b. Solid fuels include 
bituminous coal, lignite, peat and oil shale burned directly, c. Liquid fuels 
include crude petroleum and natural gas liquids, d. Gas includes natural gas and 
other petroleum gases, e. Electricity includes primary production from hydro, 
nuclear, and geothermal sources.
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Table 2.3 Total Coal Requirements, By Type of Coal, 1989, Hungary and OECD Europe (1000 metric tons)
Hard Coal(a) Brown Coal(b) 
(lignite)
Total Brown 
Coal 
as % of 
coal 
use
Hungary
OECD
4181
340438
17722
537387
21903
877825
81
61
Source: Adapted from International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics and 
Balances of non-OECD Countries, 19 93.
Note: a. OECD total for hard coal includes sub-bituminous for all OECD Europe 
countries except Turkey and Spain, b. Ash and sulfur content in brown coal 
may vary.
Table 2.4 Total Primary Energy Supply per unit of GDP Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic vs OECD (Tonnes of oil equivalent per 000 US $)
\1985 ' 1989X ___ 1991
Hungary 1.23 1.14 1.21
Poland 2.11 1.79 1.78
Czech Republic 1.50 1.27 1.36
OECD Europe 0.4461 0.4181 0.4073
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics and Balances of non- 
OECD Countries, 1993.
Due to a lack of investment funds, as well as institutionalized 
obstacles to innovation (see section 2.3), enterprises were set back 
further regarding utilization of resources. In the CEE steel 
industry, for instance, the use of open-hearth technology is far more 
prevalent than in Western Europe or the US. Open-hearth technology 
accounts for about 55-60% of steel production in CEE, while it is 
virtually out of use in Western Europe and accounts for only about 8% 
of US steel o u t p u t . The Hungarian government, in a discussion 
about future environmental policy in its national report to UNCED in
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1992, calls its own country's production units "sluggish and out-of- 
date , "82
Hungary is still confronted with the serious consequences 
resulting from the development blunders made in the seventies. 
In other words, the major industrial investments carried out 
during the same period either introduced or expanded 
traditional mass production technologies which had been 
discarded as out of date in other parts of the world. While 
industrialized countries were entering a new stage of 
development called the third technological revolution, Hungary 
failed to transform its backward economic structure by relying 
on generous credits available in the seventies... 88
The Hungarian government blames "the forced rate of development of 
energetics, coal mining, metallurgical and heavy industry" as having 
"extremely negative consequences for the e n v i r o n m e n t . " ^4
In addition to the heavy use of low-grade coals in CEE, the
absence of flue gas desulfurization (FGD) processes in many areas has
contributed to the region's disproportionate amount of SO2 emissions,
according to lEA Coal Research, a project within the International
Energy A g e n c y , 8 5 According to lEA Coal Research, it is estimated
that CEE is currently responsible for two-thirds of Europe's SO2
emissions. Combustion modifications, which can be used to achieve
low NOx emissions equivalent to 8^ % reductions, are also lacking in
CEE.86 ieA Coal Research, which is funded by the OECD, 14Xgovernments and the Commission of the European Communities, maintains 
that a lack of financing and generally poor economic conditions in 
CEE has left a significant percentage of coal-fired industries 
without FGD p r o c e s s e s . 87 A lack of financial resources to upgrade, 
rebuild and modernize existing coal-fired power generation plants, or 
to build new plants, has been alleviated somewhat by joint venture 
projects with Western firms, but a general lack of funds has been an 
ongoing problem in the challenge to improve air pollution in the 
region.88
Water and soil pollution
For Hungary at least, water and soil pollution have received 
slightly less attention than air pollution. This is not necessarily 
because water and soil have evaded degradation over the past several 
decades, but rather because air pollution's transboundary nature 
implies negative effects for more states than Hungary's immediate
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neighbors. According to World Resources Institute, water quality in
CEE has been degraded through fertilizer and animal waste runoff, the
dumping of raw sewage and heavy industrial w a s t e . 89 Dumping of
industrial effluents laced with heavy metals and toxic, and sometimes
radioactive, chemicals into the region's rivers has made-much of the
water unfit for drinking or industrial u s e . 48 a Hungarian government
study published in 1990 addresses water quality in the country over
the course of three successive five-year p l a n s . 41 The study of five
rivers in Hungary--The Kapos, Zala, Zagyva and border sections of the
Danube and Tisza -- found steady deterioration in water quality in
the period 1971-85. The water quality indicators studied include the
following: COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand, which measures how much
oxidizing power is needed to break down impurities in water); BOD5
(Biological Oxygen Demand, or the level of degradable organics in
water over a 5-day incubation period); dissolved O2 (dissolved
oxygen, an important measure of crucial gases for fish and aquatic
life); ammonium ion, nitrate ion and orthophosphate ion (which are
indicators of fertilizer runoff), as well as total dissolved solids
(a measure of the amount of salt in the water).42
The Kapos River has deteriorated in every category except for
nitrate; the Zala River has no imjprovements except for BOD5 ,
dissolved O2 , and ammonium, and the Zagyva River is worse off exceptXfor BOD5 . The rate of deterioration showed an increasing trend for 
orthophosphate, but a levelling off for total dissolved solids.
Danube water quality, as it enters Hungary, has consistently 
deteriorated in terms of nitrate and dissolved solids. As the water 
leaves Hungary it is worse off only in terms of ammonium, nitrate and 
total dissolved solids; the other components registered improvements. 
The rate of deterioration of the Tisza River is one of the highest 
for any body of water in Hungary, As it enters Hungary, the Tisza 
has consistently deteriorated in terms of ammonium, nitrate and total 
dissolved solids, while at its outflow measurement point, all 
components, except for orthophosphate and BOD5 , indicate poorer water 
quality. The study concludes that compared with research undertaken 
3 0 years ago, this data reveal a "startling deterioration in water 
quality."48 For Hungary as a whole, the ground waters in the 0-20 
meter depth range are so polluted that they cannot be considered for 
drinking water s u p p l y . 44
4 4
Il
Water quality in other CEE states has been similarly 
d e g r a d e d . 45 Upper Silesia in Poland, about 950,000 cubic meters
of saline water is pumped daily from coal mines, of which about
650,000 cubic meters--containing about 7,000 metric tons of salt--is 
fed daily into the tributaries of the Oder and Vistula rivers.
Surface water in Poland has continued to deteriorate over the last 25 
years. Class I water, defined as drinkable after disinfection, 
constituted 33% of the total length of monitored rivers in the 
country in 1967. By 1986, Class I water was found in only about 4% 
of Poland's total river length. "Unclassed" water, or water unfit 
for even industrial purposes, rose from 23% in 1967 to 39% in 1986.46 
About half of Poland's cities (including Warsaw) and 15% of its 
industrial facilities have no wastewater treatment systems, and about 
32% of wastewater needing treatment is left untreated. In the former 
Czechoslovakia, groundwater contamination also has increased sharply; 
over the past 3 0 years, average nitrate levels in groundwater in the 
built-up areas of cities and towns rose from 3 0 to 12 0 milligrams per 
liter.47
Forest defoliation and soil damage have also been a problem in 
the region,. Table 2.5 outlines forest defoliation in Europe in 1989. 
While only 12.7% of Hungary's trees^nationwide were classified as 
suffering moderate to severe defoliation, the researchers reported a 
trend in the deterioration of older trees. The study showed that 33% 
of the (then) Czechoslovakia's trees were classed having undergone 
moderate to severe defoliation, and 31.9% of Poland's were classed as 
such. Belarus had the highest percentage of moderate to severe 
defoliation, with 76.2% of trees affected (based on a regional 
sample).
Defoliation is not limited to the East; the European state with 
the fifth worst percentage of forest defoliation was the United 
Kingdom, with 28% of trees affected, and the sixth worst, Denmark, 
with 26% affected. Soil degradation, caused by such activities as 
inappropriate agricultural techniques, pollution from mining 
operations and the dumping of industrial, residential and 
agricultural waste, has also affected states throughout CEE.48
4 5
Table 2.5 Forest Defoliation in Europe, 1989
(% of trees affected)
Moderate to Severe No Defoliation(Class 0)Country(a ) (Classes 2-4)
Byelorussia (R) 76.2 15.0Kaliningrad (R) 35.0 26.9Czechoslovakia (N) 33.0 26.0Poland (N) 31.9 22.0United Kingdom (N) 28.0 41.0Denmark (N) 26.0 48.0Bulgaria (N) 24.9 40.5Slovenia (R) 22.6 60.3Finland (N) 18.0 60.1German Dem. Rep. (N) 16.4 45.7Germany, Fed. Rep. (N) 15.9 47.1Norway (N)(b) 14.8 57.0Sweden (N)(b) 12.9 51.9Hungary (N) 12.7 63.6Switzerland (N) 12.0 57.0Italy (N) 9.1 75.8France (N) 5.6 79.3Austria (N) 4.4 74.6Spain (N) 3.3 78.0? \
Source: Chrisker Agren, "Forest Decline Continues," Acid News, December 
1990, p. 5. ^  ^
Notes :
a. Based on Nationwide (N) or regional (R) figures for all tree species, 
unless noted.
b. Conifers only.
In Hungary (whose territory constitutes 88% arable land, three- 
quarters of which is cultivated) over 50% of the country's cultivated 
land is being exposed to natural or man-made degradation such as soil 
acidification and e r o s i o n . 49 The acceleration of soil acidification 
has been caused primarily by what the Hungarian government calls "the 
incompetent use of fertilizers and the widespread application of 
superphosphate, often containing a great deal of acid r e s i d u e s . . . " . ^ O  
In addition to poor quality fertilizers, the government also cites 
atmospheric precipitation and inefficient liming practices as 
contributing to soil acidification. The result, the Hungarian 
government says, has been a dramatic decline in y i e l d s . The post- 
1989 government blames central planning for Hungary's present soil 
problems, saying planners did not take into consideration
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"differences in natural endowments" and, with high output targets in 
mind, sanctioned the use of inappropriate machinery for particular 
soil types, as well as cultivation of row crops in hilly and sloping 
areas.52 Hungary, ironically, is much better suited for non-chemical 
farming than other European states, but because of political pressure 
to produce high yields, such techniques were never exploited, and in 
the long-run, fertility was s a c r i f i c e d . 58 Non-agricultural soil has 
also been degraded as a result of illegal dumping of industrial waste 
containing heavy metals or other substances hazardous to human 
health.54
Pre-1989 ffovernment policy
The Hungarian government in its 19 92 report to UNCED 
acknowledged that in developed market economies, where environmental 
degradation can also be a problem, the role of promoting 
environmental protection is usually played by a civil society and 
especially the middle class, which has control over the economy and 
the state. The government asserts: "In east European countries, 
however, the low level of civil development as well as totalitarian 
state socialism prevented the emergence of civil society and the 
middle classes."55 The report calls attention to the Gabcikovo- 
Nagymoros dam dispute, which played a;: indirect role in pressuring 
the government for democratization. However, the government stresses 
that the general level of ecological consciousness is still rather 
low. "The majority of people don't want to (and certain social groups 
are not able to) make any more sacrifices for the sake of environment 
at the expense of their declining living standards."56 The report to 
UNCED calls for greater emphasis on environmental education, though 
with the changes occurring in education as well, not much progress 
has been made in increasing environmental awareness.57
Hungarian environmental groups are quick to point out that laws 
existed to protect the environment as far back as the 19th century, 
and especially since World War II. However, at least during the 
post-WW II period, laws went largely unenforced. The laws enacted in 
the 1960s and 70s, on mining (1960), land (1961), forests and 
forestry (1961), water management (1964), construction activities 
(1964), medical care (1972), nature conservation (1961) as well as a 
law-decree on the protection of air purity (1973) contained detailed 
provisions including environmental standards and n o r m s . 5 8  However,
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the post-1989 government acknowledges that apart from the decree on
the protection of air purity, the laws were mostly motivated by the
desire to protect resources needed for production, not by ecological
c o n c e r n s . 59 Though Hungary did not participate in the Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, policies later began to
incorporate the recommendations put forth at the c o n f e r e n c e .^ 8 The
1976 Act on Environmental Protection stated that each citizen of
Hungary had the right to live in a healthy environment and that
society should be interested and involved in the protection of the
human environment.The Act summarized targets and principles of
environmental policy and provided for the establishment of an
independent system to manage environmental protection.52 Despite
well-intentioned sounding declarations on the environment, the
fundamental problem of regulation in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE was
that if a state-owned enterprise pollutes the environment, the state
itself must fine it. A western parallel would be a multinational
corporation having to fine its subsidiaries for polluting the
environment. The contradiction of the state having to fine itself
proved a serious obstacle to enforcement. In its report to UNCED, the
post-1989 government asserts: "The general political and economic\ ?targets have been in sharp contrast with the declared goals of 
environmental policy." And furthermor^,"The political leadership 
has refused to take unpopular measures by reallocating economic 
resources for environmental p u r p o s e s . "58
The transboundary nature of air pollution has led to a number 
of international agreements which have been signed and adopted by 
several European countries, including the protocols to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), as well as the European Union 
directives.54 The LRTAP convention in 1979 stated general principles 
of international cooperation for the abatement of air pollution. The 
SO2 "30% Club" protocol, also called the Helsinki protocol, has been 
signed and ratified by 20 member states, including Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech and Slovak republics. The protocol calls for a 30% 
reduction in SO2 emissions as soon as possible, or by 1993.55 
November 1988, an NO^ protocol was signed in Sofia, Bulgaria by 24 
parties to the convention, including Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
and Slovak republics, and was subsequently ratified by 19 countries. 
The NOx protocol calls for a freezing of participants' NOx emissions
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at 1987 levels or levels of any earlier year before December 31,
1994. However, as discussed above, CEE states have had a difficult 
time meeting the goals of international agreements due to a lack of 
financial resources to upgrade existing coal-fired generation 
plants.56
Health quality in CEE
Few research organizations are willing to establish a direct 
link between environmental degradation and poor public health because 
one of the key measures of health problems -- death from disease -- 
is difficult to tie to any one factor, namely the environment. This 
is true particularly in CEE due to a variety of lifestyle factors 
such as a high incidence of smoking, drinking, poor diets and stress 
among members of the population in the region, which like the 
environment are known to contribute to diseases such as emphysema and 
c a n c e r . 57 However, even when balanced with unhealthy lifestyle 
characteristics, data on CEE indicate some of the bleakest health 
conditions in the industrialized world.5& This section contains two 
parts: first, an evaluation directly from the Hungarian government
twhich points to environmental factors as thé cause of jpiealth 
problems, particularly respiratory problems; and second, data from 
the World Health Organization (WHO) European Center for Environment 
and Health in Bilthoven, the Netherlands. For various health 
indicators, the WHO database is a compilation of information from its 
own records, individual country statistics, the OECD and various ad 
hoc reports.59 The WHO data selected and adapted for this study 
compare Hungary, France and Sweden, three European states with 
varying levels of environmental degradation. As a basis for 
comparison to a CEE state, France and Sweden are useful, as France 
represents average health performance in Europe, and Sweden 
represents near-best health performance in Europe.
The Hungarian government states matter-of-factly in its report 
to UNCED that due to the health-damaging effects of air-polluting 
substances, acute respiratory diseases are on the r i s e . 78 i n  
settlements with polluted air, the rate of chronic bronchitis among 
the adult population is three times above the Hungarian average, 
while the rate of bronchitis is gradually increasing among children 
ages 7-17 years. The government further states that the rate of
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asthma more than doubled in Budapest between 1979 and 1987, and the 
city's population, particularly students, are frequently attacked by 
anaemia and osteogenesis d i s o r d e r s . 71 The Hungarian government, at 
the time the report to UNCED was written, maintained that the 
concentration of "carcinogenic, polycyclic and aromatic hydrocarbons" 
was two to four times higher than permitted in several industrial 
towns. Hydrocarbon pollution, meanwhile, on the busy roads in 
Budapest was more than five times higher than the US norm.72 
Conservative estimates put the yearly health damages (including costs 
and losses) caused by air pollution at at least three times higher 
than air protection i n p u t s . 73
The Hungarian government shows little hesitation in stressing 
that the state of the environment in the country has affected the 
disease and mortality rates of the population, with air pollution the 
environmental problem that affects health to the largest extent: 
"...it is very deplorable that about 44.5% of the population live in 
polluted and 30% in heavily polluted areas exposed to three kinds of 
pollutants at least."74 Another report maintains that Hungarian air 
is polluted on over 11% of the country's territory.75 Table 2.6 
provides a breakdown of solids, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides 
emissions in Hungary during the T980s. Industi^ has contributed 
significantly to air pollution levels^ for reasons that will be 
discussed later in a more detailed discussion of industrial structure
in the command e c o n o m y . 76
Table 2.6 Emission of Air Polluting Materials in Hungary 1980-1989 (kilotons/year)
Polluting Material
Year Solids Sulfur Dioxide Nitrogen Oxides
1980 576.6 1632.8 272.91985 491.6 1403.6 262.21986 463.6 1370.1 268.61987 433.6 1291.9 276.01988 407.8 1218.0 258.31989 343.0 1084.0 249.0
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Table 2.6 
(cent'd)
Emission of Air Polluting Materials in Hungary, 1989, by sector (kilotons/year)
802 NOx Solids
Power stations 436.4 49.6 39.2Industry 316.4 45.5 ■ 187.1Agriculture, Forestry 23.8 7.7 7.0Traffic, transport 16.5 116.1 11.8Population 249 .7 19.9 86.0Services 27 .9 6.8 10.6Heat supply (other than by the Hungarian 
electricity board)
13.3 3.4 1.3
TOTAL 1084.0 249.0 343.0
Source: Ministry for Environment and Regional Policy, Government of Hungary, 
Air Pollution Abatement Policy in Hungary, Budapest, 1991.
Empirical data from the World Health Organization show that 
since 1970, life expectancy at age one in Hungary has declined, while 
it has increased in France and Sweden (see appendix for chart). In 
Hungary in 1991, life expectancy^for both sexes at age one was 69.5 
years, down from 70.8 in 1970, By contrast, in France in 1990, life 
expectancy was 77.10, up from 73.0 in 1970. In Sweden in 1989, life 
expectancy at age one was 77.20, up from 74.6 in 1970. Another key 
health indicator, infant mortality, has declined markedly in Hungary 
since 1970, but is still significantly higher than France and Sweden. 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births in Hungary in 1989 was 15.74, 
compared with 23.97 in 1979 and 35.89 in 1970. In France, infant 
mortality in 1989 was 7.54, down from 10.01 in 1979 and 15.14 in 
1970. Sweden showed the least cases of infant mortality in 1970, 
with 5.77 per 1,000 live births in 1989, compared with 7.48 in 1979 
and 11.0 in 1970.77
Using Standardized Death Rate (SDR), a statistical measurement 
whereby comparative old-age mortality is taken into account, the 
World Health Organization also charts death rates for various 
diseases found throughout Europe. The SDR from malignant neoplasms, 
or cancer, per 100,000 people ages 0-64 in Hungary is significantly 
higher than in France and Sweden, and has been trending higher over
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the past decade. In 1989, Hungary had 132.04 deaths per 100,000 
people from malignant neoplasms, up over 18% from 1979 when it had 
111.24. In France and Sweden, the number of deaths from malignant 
neoplasms fell by 1.5% and 9.3%, respectively. France had 97.61 
deaths from malignant neoplasms in 1989, down from 99.05 -in 1979, 
while Sweden had 67.19 deaths from cancers in 1989, down from 74.07 
in 1979.78
Respiratory disease, one of the groups of ailments social 
scientists seem most willing to link to high pollution levels, is 
also an area where Hungary is worse off than other parts of Europe. 
Deaths from diseases of the respiratory system, ages 0-64, were 20.3 3 
per 100,000 in Hungary in 1989, compared with 8.06 for France and 
7.50 for Sweden. A similar measure is deaths per 100,000 for all 
ages from bronchitis, emphysema and asthma, which shows similar 
country characteristics. For this measure, Hungary had 39.31 deaths 
in 1989, compared with 10.01 for France and 11.72 for Sweden. Death 
from diseases of the circulatory system, per 100,000 people ages 0- 
64, shows Hungary is again far behind western Europe. In 1989, 
Hungary had 171.38 deaths from circulatory diseases, up 7.8% from 
158.92 in 197 9, while France had just 42.89, down 32% from 63.04 in 
1979. Sweden had 59.85 deaths fj?^ m circulatory problems^ in the same 
age group per 100,000 people in 1989^ down 28% from 83.14 in 1979. 
Occupational health, though improving in Hungary since the late 
1970s, is still comparatively worse than in France and Sweden. In 
1989, fatalities in work-related accidents, per 100,000, were 4.16 in 
Hungary, compared with 1.13 in Sweden and 2.10 in F r a n c e . 79
Lifestyle characteristics, as stated earlier, are significant 
factors that must be figured into the human health equation. For 
instance, in Hungary in 1989, annual cigarette consumption per person 
in units was 2591.72, up from 2434.55 in 197 9. Sweden's annual 
cigarette consumption that year was 1316.73, down from 1539.12 in 
1979. In France, meanwhile, 1989 cigarette consumption in units was 
1690.33, down from 1699.59 a decade before.88 According to World 
Resources Institute (WRI), the health effects of smoking in CEE are 
exacerbated due to the high percentage of people smoking high-tar, 
high-nicotine cigarettes, which are associated with lung and other 
types of cancers. WRI also points to high-fat diets and alcoholism as 
contributing to poor health in the region.81
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The lack of willingness on the part of statisticians to link 
the environment with poor public health seems to be due less to the 
fact that the links are precarious than to the fact that large 
subject areas of central and east European life have yet to be 
studied. WRI suggests that stress may also contribute to certain 
diseases in the r e g i o n . Perhaps rigid work environments in the 
command economy system, a lack of opportunity for upward mobility and 
sub-standard living conditions also play a role in quality of health; 
questions such as why people in CEE smoke and drink more than the 
populations of western Europe have yet to be answered. What kind of 
stresses accompanied being a worker in the command economy? Was life 
in the Soviet bloc such that people were less conscious, or able, to 
maintain healthy living habits? Substantive research still needs to 
be carried out on the effects of such factors on public h e a l t h . 8 3  
Life in CEE prior to 1989 needs to be viewed in its entirety, and 
until the relevant gaps are filled in, it will not be possible to 
draw any definitive conclusions about the effects pollution may have 
had on public health before 1989 and into the future.
Environmental degradation in CEE and the Western media
Journalists have been far morexvocal about environmental 
degradation in CEE than have social scientists, and have played the 
largest part in communicating to the world the conditions under which 
many central and east Europeans live. Despite a large element of 
sensationalism in international magazines such as Time and Newsweek 
(for instance, cover stories entitled "Deadly Fate: A Health Crisis 
of Near Epidemic Proportions is Devastating Eastern Europe and 
C u b a , "84 and "Wasteland: The Soviet Environmental N i g h t m a r e " 85) the 
press has served a valuable purpose. Sketchy data on environment and 
health in CEE have provided the impetus for investigative journalists 
and photographers to visit environmentally unsafe areas in order to 
speak with officials, environmentalists, researchers and ordinary 
people. Photos, articles and documentaries of highly degraded places 
such as Copsa Mica, Romania, the "black town," whose population 
suffers from problems ranging from low life expectancy to male 
impotency due to high blood lead levels, show the world just what 
central and east Europeans are f a c i n g . 86 other areas that have 
received graphic media coverage include the city of Mezibori in the
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Czech Republic, where children wear face masks to school to protect 
themselves from severe air pollution,87 ^s well as the former Soviet 
fishing village of Muinak on the Aral Sea, which is now a desert town 
as a result of water diversion for cotton f a r m i n g . 88 In 1990, one 
media report quoted public-health biologists in Hungary as 
calculating that illnesses traceable to environmental pollution 
consume more than 13% of the country's health budget. . The same 
report quoted officials as estimating that at least one out of 17 
Hungarians die from environmentally induced c a u s e s . 89 such articles 
provide the images which help to string together the sketchy 
environmental data on CEE pollution: Time reports that Near Leipzig, 
Germany, in a town called Espenhain, which is heavily dependent on 
coal-burning power plants, four out of five children develop chronic 
bronchitis or heart ailments by the age of s e v e n . ^0
Of course, Chernobyl has also received enormous media 
attention. Photographs of colts with eight legs, pigs with no eyes 
and oversize fish in nearby waterways only lead the public to ask 
what effect the radiation resulting from the disaster must have had 
on h u m a n s . 81 In an article in National Geographic in August 1994, 
Chernobyl researchers are quoted as saying that due to a lack of 
medical records or carelessly kept records, no one knows how many 
people died or are ill as a result of ailments suffered following the 
explosion in 1986. Thousands are thought to have died since 1986 
from radiation-related ailments. Better information exists on 
childhood thyroid cancer in the region, which, once an extremely rare 
condition in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, now totals more than 300 
cases. Research conducted by Kiev researcher Maria Pilinskaya on 
children from areas in non-evacuated regions just outside the 
perceived "danger zone" indicates widespread chromosome damage, which 
Pilinskaya has linked to thyroid d i s o r d e r s . 82
Another investigative report in National Geographic revealed a 
bizarre spate of birth defects in Moscow. In two city neighborhoods 
within three miles of each other, eight children were born within a 
year of each other with shortened left arms. Worldwide, terminal 
limb deficiency occurs at a rate of once in 4,000 births. Letters to 
officials from alarmed parents, united as a result of their own 
initiative, eventually prompted geneticists to investigate. The 
researchers in the end declared the cluster of birth defects a 
coincidence, but the Moscow sanitation office has tentatively blamed
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the industrial chemical dioxin. Still other scientists question that 
assumption, and the likelihood of a definitive diagnosis ever 
emerging seems r e m o t e . 83
While the media has often seized on the most graphic and 
manipulative images to convey the problems of environmental 
degradation in the former Soviet bloc, it nonetheless serves as a 
valuable disseminator of environmental information on the region. 
Improved information flow to the Western public since 1989 may 
encourage environmental groups and individuals to urge their leaders 
to continue programs of loans and assistance to the region.
2.3 THE COMMAND ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
The above data show that the populations of central and east 
European states have higher infant mortality, lower life expectancy 
and a higher propensity toward respiratory ailments and other 
diseases than their counterparts in western European states. This 
section will go beyond a description of environment and health in the 
region to analyze the economic and political conditions underlying 
these comparatively poor health conditions. It will address the 
significant features about CEE societies prior to 1989, when much of 
the environmental damage was done, which set them apart from the 
West. The most significant economic feature to be addressed here is 
the command system, whereby resource allocation is based on 
administrative orders rather than on market signals.84 The other 
most significant factor to be addressed is the political system under 
which these states operated: Soviet-style state socialism, inspired 
by Marxism-Leninism, and executed by the Communist P a r t y . 85 unlike 
Western systems, where economics and politics can be discussed 
relatively separately, when looking at the CEE systems the two must 
be considered together.86 As part of an environmental study of the 
region, this link is of particular importance. In the CEE systems, 
economics and politics were inextricably tied, as the Communist Party 
held the central leadership role in economic planning. The state was 
in control of all economic activities, as well as the pace of 
economic growth and capital formation. In this government-controlled 
system, group interests dominated over individual interests.
Kaminski argues that what sets apart state socialism from other 
systems is "the unique symbiosis of the state with society and the
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economy" in what he calls the fusion p r i n c i p l e As a result of 
fusion, both politics and economics lose their distinctive 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 88 a key factor in understanding the system’s impact 
on the environment.
Communism in the Marxist sense envisioned a classless, 
equitable society in which workers and peasants would not be 
alienated as they had been under capitalism. The regime's political 
creed was based on economic equality and fairness, and the way this 
equality was to be achieved was through command and control of the 
means of production and distribution.89 Individual happiness was to 
be achieved through the economic well-being of the state: 
collectivism was a higher virtue than individualism. However, what 
evolved under Josef Stalin in the Soviet Union from the 1920s onward, 
and in central and eastern Europe after World War II, was a rapidly 
industrializing, resource-consuming society under which the relative 
humanization, or dehumanization, of workers and peasants was 
debatable. The command economy was the system under which this rapid 
industrialization o c c u r r e d . 180 prom the very start of the Soviet 
Union's first Five-Year Plan in 1928, the command economy was geared 
toward transforming a poor, agrarian-based system into the Marxist 
ideal of an advanced industrial society.181 The first Plan was 
completed in just over four years, w^th 86% of all industrial 
investment in heavy industry.182 it was the Stalinist economic and 
political system which was, with the noteworthy exception of 
Yugoslavia, (Yugoslavia having split from what it viewed as Soviet 
hegemony in 1948)183 transplanted to the CEE states after World War 
II to greater and lesser degrees. Stalin's goal of rapid 
industrialization was broadened to its newly acquired satellites 
after World War II as the Cold War commenced.184
This section's primary aim is to describe the Soviet model of 
economic planning which was, as Swain maintains, the "blueprint" 
applied to create Communist economies in central and eastern 
E u r o p e . 185 First, however, a discussion of the role of nature in 
classical Marxism will provide the background for discussion on the 
state of the environment in the command economy. In addition, a brief 
history will be given describing how CEE became incorporated, both 
economically and politically, into the Soviet sphere after World War 
II. With the historical backdrop set, a description of the highly 
politicized command economy will seek to explain how industries in
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central and east European states utilized natural resources and 
interacted with their environments. Included will be a discussion of 
material balance planning; prices and the allocation of natural 
resources; and the organization and regulation of economic a c t o r s . 186 
Specific features about these economies will be addressed in an 
attempt to pinpoint where the excesses may have occurred which led to 
environmental degradation and health problems such as those described 
in the previous section.
It is important to note as a footnote to this discussion that 
between the late 1940s and 1989, when the Soviet bloc dissolved, 
major differences existed among the CEE states both culturally and 
economically, in part based on differing levels of development prior 
to their integration into the Soviet bloc. Though this study is 
meant to be a general survey of the command economy system (by 
necessity emphasizing the Soviet Union) it will again focus in on 
Hungary as a case study for the reasons described in Section 2.1.
Marxism and the role of nature in the coxnmand economy
The role of nature in the command economy can be directly 
traced to such 19th century thinkers as Karl Marx and Frederick 
E n g e l s .  3-87 the 19 th century when Karl Marx was writing, the 
concepts of industrial waste and air pollution were barely conceived 
o f ,  3-88 and were about a century away from being seriously 
incorporated into economic thought. However, the idea of using nature 
to further human progress and improve man's position in society was 
very much a factor in Marx's writing, as well as in the writing of 
his contemporary E n g e l s .  3-89 While many of their ideas about the way 
in which society should function have been adapted or adjusted 
somewhat in their 20th-century applications, man's approach to nature 
was one area in which the Soviet and CEE economies stuck fairly close 
to Marxist theory. Marx left few instructions regarding what the 
socialist society and economy should look l i k e ,  3-3-0 and likely never 
imagined the impact that rapid industrialization may have had on 
future ecosystems. He would have had a difficult enough time applying 
his conception of class struggle and the evolution of communism to 
the relatively agrarian Russia, let alone to the rest of the Soviet 
Union and its satellites (Das Capital was written with England and 
Germany in mind).3-11 The Marxist scenario, which envisions slavery
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being replaced by feudalism and feudalism being replaced by 
capitalism, ends with the overthrow of capitalism and the 
establishment of a socialist society. In the highest stage, after 
capitalism is overthrown, class differences should disappear.
In this scenario, the role of nature is subsumed by the urgency 
of the class issue. To Marx nature was merely the equipment needed 
by man to fuel his advancement, producing goods as part of an 
historical process called m a t e r i a l i s m . Aronowitz, quoting Marx, 
writes; "Nature is merely the 'raw material' for labor...a 'tool 
house' that provides labor with 'stones for throwing, grinding, 
pressing, cutting, e t c . '"114 Aronowitz stresses that the concept of 
"nature" is an historical creation which demarcates humans from the 
rest of the environment, and was likely seen so at the time Marx was 
w r i t i n g . 115 Also influential in the 19th century were writers such 
as Thoreau, who, quite the opposite from Marx, viewed nature as 
something that needed protecting. As part of the anti-urban, anti­
industrialist Romanticist movement, thinkers such as Thoreau,
Whitman, Emerson and Blake sought to defend nature from the ravages 
of materialism and other ill effects of civilization.H 5  Romanticism 
differed from the Marxian conviction that industrialization was a 
progressive force which harnessed^technology to natural resources in 
order to reduce dependency on agriculture and advance human 
progress.117 The Romanticists "preached the notion of a bioethic, a 
sense of responsibility for the earth and a plea for a basic 
ecological understanding before tampering with its resources."H 8 
In the 19th century, science as well as Romanticism viewed nature as 
something separate from humans, contrasting sharply from today's 
concept of ecology. Aronowitz writes: "The 'awe and wonder' with 
which the romantics celebrate a tree was scorned by Marx, who 
reminded the poets that ... a tree was a product of human labor as 
much as a natural historical thing."118
Engels, by contrast, insisted that humans were part of natural 
history, and that the distinction between them and the natural world 
should not be made into a sharp dichotomy.1^8 in his essay "The Part 
Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man," Engels asserts 
that economic growth does not have to disrupt man's harmony with 
nature.121 Engels acknowledged that man's mastery of nature could 
pose a threat to material advance itself.
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Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account 
of our human victories over nature. For each such victory 
nature takes its revenge on us...we are reminded that we by 
no means rule over nature, like someone standing outside 
nature, but that we...belong to nature, and exist in its
midst, and that all over master of it consists in the fact
that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being 
able to learn its laws and apply them c o r r e c t l y . 122
Yet Engels had confidence in man's inventiveness to overcome any
problems in the course of his modern relationship with nature.
"...With every day that passes we are acquiring a better
understanding of [nature's] laws and getting to perceive both the
more immediate and the more remote consequences of our interference
with the traditional course of n a t u r e . "123 Engels' assertion that
man should be able to cope with the consequences of his use of nature
was unique in Marxist t h o u g h t . 124
Despite Engels' influences, the Marxist theory which trickled
down to the 20th century and applied to the Soviet Union by Lenin and
later by Stalin viewed nature as merely a condition of p r o d u c t i o n . 125
...Nature itself has no materiality within contemporary 
Marxist thought. Nor does it really enter the social 
process except as a suppressed, unconscious instance of 
history. It appears as catastrophe, unexplained accidents, 
and the raw materials of human intervention. The burden 
of science and technology since Bacon and Newton has been 
to make society independent, of nature's metabolism by 
adjusting it to our rhythms, by factoring it to human 
production, and historical materialism too knows only one 
science: History as the dialectic of labor, a practice
which is presumed adequate to subsume nature as well as 
spirit under production.126
Koseltsev of Moscow State University takes a similar stance. "Marx
and Lenin paid very little attention to environmental issues.... The
protection of nature...was treated in the classic way, simply as a
factor increasing productivity."127
Gregory and Stuart maintain that Marxist theory has complicated
the breakdown of valuation of environmental damage in the Soviet
economy.128 The application of Marx's labor theory of value, which
prejudices against charging for natural resources, meant that natural
resources as well as the right to pollute were given to enterprises
free of charge, thereby encouraging o v e r u s e . 129 The valuation
dilemma is not unique to command economies : Capitalist economies have
had similar problems assigning costs to pollution and to the
depletion of natural resources. Marx's approach to nature was also
translated into the economies of CEE in the governments' emphasis on
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heavy i n d u s t r y . 130 the region's economies became so focused on
heavy industry after World War II, and the consequences of such 
policy decisions on the environment, will be discussed below.
The polarization of East and West
The establishment of command economy systems in central and 
eastern Europe can be traced to the end of World War II and the 
economic and political polarization of Europe following the Allied 
victory over the Axis powers. Though rooted in basic ideological 
differences between the Soviet Union and the western Allies, the 
division by the superpowers of east and west Europe into two opposite 
camps was a classic example of realist geopolitics discussed in 
Chapter 1.131 The question of Germany's future--how to prevent a 
resurgence of militarism there, and who would gain more influence 
over that strategically located state--were among the most critical 
concerns of both the West and the Soviet Union in the years following 
the war. 132 After the trauma of the war-time German invasion, and 
with Stalin growing increasingly paranoid about the United States' 
use of its nuclear capability as diplomatic leverage, the Soviets 
were keen to have as many buffer 'states as they could pull into their 
camp. In addition to Germany, Poland^was a major point of contention. 
Stalin's concerns were matched by growing anti-communist fervor in 
the United States.133 The Truman administration saw the Soviets as 
viewing capitalism as a system ready to collapse, with socialism set 
to replace it. Schulzinger maintains that the commander of US forces 
in Germany, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, similarly believed the Soviets were 
seeking Communist rule for all of Germany as a first step in their 
eventual subjugation of Western Europe.134
In 1947, President Truman's desire to see communists eliminated 
from Greece and Turkey was the beginning of the policy of containment 
that was to be the feature of US foreign policy in Europe and 
elsewhere for the next several decades. As part of Truman's bid to 
provide financial aid for anti-communists in Greece and Turkey, the 
President declared the US's commitment to aid all governments facing 
domestic leftist insurrections. Dubbed the "Truman Doctrine," the 
president's declaration was part of the administration's strategy to 
keep European states devastated by war from moving to the left of the 
political spectrum, as a move left was perceived as a geopolitical
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point for the S o v i e t s . 135 The actual concept of containment was 
articulated in 1947 in the journal Foreign Affairs by George Kennan 
(writing anonymously), who said Moscow's foreign policy rested on 
three pillars: traditional Russian imperialism, revolutionary 
Communist ideology and the paranoid suspicions of Josef Stalin.
Kennan was doubtful that the Soviets would be able to maintain a 
Marxist state. He wrote that while the West waited for the Soviet 
Union to abandon communism, the US should play an active role to 
"contain" it in areas of Eastern Europe already under Soviet control. 
He predicted that the US would have to engage in the support of an 
array of "satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets" of its own, 
resulting in a perpetual "Cold War" with the Soviet U n i o n . 3^ 6
A second aspect of the administration's strategy was announced 
by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who invited European states 
to request aid from the US for reconstruction of their badly damaged 
economies and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . 137 The European Recovery Plan, as i t  
came to be called, was aimed at preventing a communist seizure of 
power in such states such as France, Germany and Italy, as well as 
strengthening markets for American goods. Though the Marshall Plan
was not specifically aimed at polarizing Europe, its end result wasIjust^that. Though the Czechs and'Nihe Poles sent representatives to a 
meeting to draft the program, the Soviets quickly made it known that 
they believed participation in the Marshall Plan would permanently 
link the economies of CEE with the US. The end result was that 
neither the Soviet Union nor its allies in CEE took p a r t . 138 The 
Marshall Plan's positive reception in the West was due not only to 
economic necessity, but also to the fact that the aid recipients were 
already allies of the US. By contrast, the Soviet Union's success in 
expanding its influence in central and eastern Europe was far from 
the result of old friendships with Poland, Hungary and other states; 
rather, the war had left the region with devastated economies,
refugee crises, fears of further German aggression.
The resulting cohesion of the western Allies was 
institutionalized in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in 1949.139 other evidence of the division between East 
and West was seen in the United Nations, when regular confrontations 
resulted in the Soviet Union's constant use of its Security Council
veto power: Of the 80 vetoes issued at the UN between 1945 and 1955,
77 belonged to the Soviet Union.140 East-West tensions finally came
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to a head in Berlin in 1948 when the Soviets stopped the overland 
supplies of the US, British and French sectors to the divided city. 
The Soviet effort to blockade much of the city collapsed as US and 
British planes continuously kept the areas supplied with airlifted 
goods. Following the Soviet Union's failure in the Berlin blockade, 
the polarization between East and West was complete with the 
formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Western-occupied 
zones in 1949, and the German Democratic Republic in the east the
same y e a r . 1 ^ 1
The incorporation of CEE into the Soviet bloc
The actual incorporation of the CEE states into the Soviet bloc 
came in stages and with different levels of difficulty for the 
Soviets. The states differed markedly in the strength of their 
communist movements and their willingness to cooperate with the 
Soviets. In Poland, for instance, the native Communists were 
extremely weak, while in Yugoslavia and Albania they had led 
resistance movements against the Axis powers and had attained 
dominant positions at the end of the w a r . 1 ^ 2  strong communist 
movements did'not necessarily me^, pro-Soviet movements. People in 
the satellites who later would becom^ prominent members of the 
Soviet-dominated political elite (such as Erich Honeker in East 
Germany) had spent time in the Soviet Union before and during the 
war, and this smattering of ideological uniformity was useful to the 
Soviets as they brought CEE into the f o l d .  3-43 Though censorship was 
imposed and greater cultural and artistic conformity demanded,^44 
much of the Soviet Union's efforts towards bringing the war-shattered 
central and eastern European states into the Soviet sphere were 
achieved via economic means. Industrialization was pushed forward and 
central planning bodies e s t a b l i s h e d .^45 states where much of the
industrial infrastructure was devastated, there was a basic need to 
rebuild and there was also a desire for economic advancement in 
societies such as Romania that were mostly agrarian. Industries were 
nationalized and agriculture moved toward c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n .
January 1949 the Communist world trade organization, the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon), was established, 
cementing at least on paper the economic link between the Soviet 
Union and CEE.^47 The CMEA included the USSR, Poland, Hungary,
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Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and A l b a n i a .  3-48 widely viewed as 
the Soviets' answer to the Marshall Plan, the CMEA was not very 
active until 1954, though from the 1950s onwards its particular mix 
of trade would become a key feature of the bloc economies.. The 
creation of planning bodies and implementation of five-year plans in 
CEE set the region into a Soviet-style command system, where 
allocation of natural resources, determination of output targets, as 
well as the accompanying nationalization of property and 
collectivization of agriculture were determined by central 
planners.149
Transferring societies with different cultures and varying 
levels of development to the Soviet model was no small task; for 
instance, at the end of WW II, Czechoslovakia already possessed an 
industrial infrastructure, while Romania and Bulgaria were largely 
agrarian. Under 10% of the labour force in Bulgaria and Romania were 
employed in industry and mining and 73% of the population depended on 
agriculture as a means of support, compared with 33% in 
Czechoslovakia (see table 2 .7 ).1^0
• \Table 2.7 Economic Development Indicators inCentral/Eastern Europe In, Inter-War Period (Inter-war boundaries)
Bulgaria
Per capita income 
(1948 US $)
% population dependent 
on agriculture
% labor force in 
agriculture
% population in 
labor force
Total population 
(millions)
68
73
80
57
6.2
Romania
60-70
72
80
58
19.2
Poland
104
60
65
47
34.5
Hungary
112
52
51
46
8.9
Czechoslovakia 
176 '
33
26-37
44
15.2
Source: Figures derived directly from, or estimated from data in N. Spulber, 
The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (New York: Wiley, 1957), except for 
per capita income, which came from United Nations, Economic Commission for 
Europe, Economic Survey of Europe in 1948, Geneva, 1949.
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The incorporation of CEE into the Soviet fold has been widely 
perceived as being forceful and totalitarian. Indeed, the use by the 
Soviets of secret police, purges, and religious repression were 
w i d e s p r e a d . 151 in the Czech lands alone, almost 10,000 people were 
in prison for political offenses at the end of 1950, and more than
16,000 people were arrested over the next two years by the state 
security forces. In the four years to the end of 1952 almost 200 
people were e x e c u t e d . 152 How the region came to be part of the 
Soviet economic and political sphere despite the accompanying 
repression can be attributed to the dire economic situation of the 
region, and the aspirations of its people to become strong after 
years of war. The Soviet use of a rapid industrialization scheme to 
achieve economic development provided people with, among other 
things, employment, health care, and confidence regarding the looming 
possibility of a resurgent Germany.
Though the differences between East and West Europe became 
stark after the war following what many writers call the 
"Stalinization" of central and eastern Europe, there were some 
similarities between the two regions which show that the move to the 
left in CEE was not entirely unique among states under 
reconstruction. For instance, the late 1940s, the United Kingdom 
nationalized its coal, steel and health sectors, and other European 
states made similar moves toward greater state control. Getting 
nations back on their feet, as seen in the United States in the 193 0s 
during the New Deal, often involved large state sectors. With that 
in mind, one can look critically at CEE in the post-war period and 
observe that the most profound changes that occurred were 
overridingly political. In the Soviet bloc, the political aspects of 
the system were by far the dominant force, over economics and 
everything else. The economic system, with its resulting 
environmental consequences, to be described below was merely the 
outgrowth of a larger political orthodoxy.
The cozmnand economy: an emphasis on heavy industry
The Marxian view that nature should be at the mercy of man's 
quest for progress had great impact on the formation of the Soviet 
economic system, and carried through with remarkable clarity to the 
formation of the command economies of the Soviet satellites a quarter
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of a century l a t e r . ^53 Several features of the CEE economic systems 
contribute to an explanation of how the region's environment became 
systematically degraded: the emphasis on heavy industry at the 
expense of consumer goods' industries, many of which would have been 
less polluting; the failure to update industrial technology as 
cleaner technology became available; the lack of a pricing structure 
to reflect relative scarcity; the absence of clearly defined property 
rights; and highly politicized, bureaucratized decision-making and 
management p r o c e s s e s .^54 Qne factor which intersects with all of 
these points is the allocation, procurement and use of natural 
resources. With much of the pollution found in CEE Europe related to 
the burning of fossil f u e l s ,  3-55 t:he question of natural resources 
serves as a good example with which to understand the dynamics of the 
economic and political system. Heavy industry needed fossil fuels to 
run, and outdated industrial technology was partly responsible for 
the failure to screen the environment from harmful e m i s s i o n s . ^ 5 6  The 
lack of clearly defined property rights meant the government could 
exploit natural resources without regard for their depletion, while 
the lack of a pricing structure tied to supply and demand meant 
industry could use natural resources to excess without regard for any 
possible negative environmental c o n s e q u e n c e s .^57 The highly 
bureaucratized and centralized government planning and management 
structure had problems managing resources for several reasons which 
will be explained below.
The emphasis on heavy industry in the former Soviet bloc has 
been well documented and much discussed. The bias toward heavy 
industry has its origins in Marx's model of expanded reproduction, 
which implies that economic growth requires that the output of 
producers' goods (Department I) should grow faster than the output of 
consumption goods (Department I I ) . ^58 Smith writes that Stalin 
himself had a preference for the production of machine-building 
ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, fuel and p o w e r , ^59 and the 
pressures of WWII reinforced the bias in the Soviet Union toward 
heavy industry. The Korean War played a major role in spurring the 
adoption of the full system of Stalinist planning as the pressure to 
produce armaments grew. In 1950, Stalin instructed Party leaders from 
across the bloc to revise their targets for heavy industry 
substantially upwards in order to meet the requirement of the Korean 
War, and also, in effect, the Cold War.^^O
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In addition, heavy industry is a mass employer, and aspiring 
toward full employment was a necessary political tool for keeping the 
regime solidly in power. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 on Hungarian investment 
show a high level of investment in heavy industry during the first 
five-year plan (see also figure 2.2). Table 2.10 shows that with 
25.2% of Hungarian national income devoted to investment at that 
time, 51.7% went to industrial investment, and of that 92.1% went to 
heavy industry and construction. This compares with Poland, which 
during a comparable period had 75% of industrial investment devoted 
to heavy industry, and with the Soviet Union, which had 85.7 pet of 
industrial investment devoted to heavy industry during its first 
five-year plan.1^2 The process of building up heavy industry 
involved investment in the production of iron, steel and engineering 
products in states throughout the bloc. The Soviet strategy was 
pursued on an autarkic basis as each state was directed to build up 
its heavy i n d u s t r i e s . 1^3 Regard was not given to the individual 
conditions in those states, especially the supply of raw materials. 
The nationalistic bias of many of the bloc states fostered the 
tendency for them to avoid exploiting their comparative advantages; 
for instance, Hungary was unwilling to participate in the expansion 
of Polish coal-mining, preferring^to develop Its own far less well-
endowed d e p o s i t s . 1G4 ^
Table 2.8 Three Variants of the Investment Component of the First Hungarian 5-Year Plan (thousand million forints)
April 1949 Dec. 1949 1951Industry 17.0 21.3 41.0of which heavy industry 18.3 37.5of which light industry 3.0 3.5Agriculture 6.0 8.0 11.0Transport 6.0 7.5 10.0Social, cultural. housebuilding 6.0 7.4 14.0Other - 6.7 9.0
Total investment 35.0 50.9 85.0
(Source: I. Peto and S. Szakacs, A Hazai Gazdasag Négy Évtizedének Torténete 
1945-1985. Az Üjjàépités és a Tervutasitâsos Irânyltâs Idoszaka 1945-1968, 
Budapest 1985, p. 156.)
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Table 2.9 Distribution of Investments in Hungary 1949-54 (%)
1 Primary material 1949 195025.0 195129.8
195234.4 195334.5
1954
30.6 1950-31.2
2 productionEngineering 10.0 12.2 8.7 8.9 5.9 9.53 Heavy Industry (1-2) 29.8 35.0 42.0 43.0 43.3 36.5 40.74 Light Industry 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.5 1.85 Food Supply 1.8 2.1 1.5 0.6 1.8 2.5 1.66 Industry (3-5) 33.3 38.1 45.0 45.5 47.0 41.5 44.17 Construction - 4.1 3.1 3.0 2.4 0.9 2.78 Agriculture 17.5 9.3 10.8 13.0 13.1 22.9 13.89 Transport 21.1 18.6 14.0 15.0 10.7 6.8 12.810 Commerce 3.5 3.1 2.3 1.8 2.4 3.4 2.511 Communal services and administration 22.8 12.4 11.6 10.5 17.9 22.0 14.812 Other 1.8 14.4 13.2 11.2 6.5 2.5 9.3
Total (6-12) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(Source: Peto and S. Szakacs, p. 160.)
Table 2.10 Comparison of Soviet Bloc Industrialization Plans
Investment as % 
of national 
income
Industrial 
investment as % 
of total 
investment
Heavy and 
construction 
investment as % 
of industrial 
investment
Bulgaria 1st 5yr 19.6Czechoslovakia 1st 5yr 22,3 Poland 6yr 21.6Hungary 1st 5yr 25.2GDR 1st 5yr 
Romania 1st 5yr Soviet Union 1st 5yr Soviet Union 2nd 5yr Soviet Union 1946-50
fulfillment 21.0
43 .140.645.451.7 53.9
53.4 
49.147.8
837875.09275
8285.783.1
[Source: Peto and S. Szakacs, p. 168.
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Figure 2.2 Hungarian Plan for Heavy Industryin the First 5-Year Plan (1950-54)
1. Production value to reach 7.725 billion forints, a 138%- increase on 1949
2. The value of machinery to increase from 185 to 610 million forints
3. The number of tractors to increase from 2,600 to 4,600 units
4. Railway carriages and trucks to increase from 4,850 to 10,000 units
5. The number of lorries to increase from 3,200 to 9,000 units
6 . The number of motorcycles to increase from 12,000 to 23,000 units
7. Steam, electrical and diesel engines to be produced to the value of 520 
million forints.
8 . The production should commence of, for example, trolley buses, harvesters, 
diesel tractors and railway cranes, (not then manufactured in Hungary)
9. A total of 4,214 million forints should be invested in a smelting works, 
machine tool factories, milling industry machinery, machinery for the textile 
and light industries, oil extraction plants, diesel motor factories, crane 
factories, screw factories, radiator factories, other manufacturing industry 
plants
10. A new steel works and railway wheel factory should be created in the 
Borsod industrial region, and a new bridge and iron structure factory by the Danube
Source: Nigel Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism (London:
Verso, 1994), pp. 55-56.
In the Soviet bloc prior to the political changes of 1989, 
planning involved determining needs in the economy, setting output 
targets and allocating resources through the use of a technique 
called "material balances." Material balance planning contrasts the 
known sources of goods with the economy's requirements in order to 
determine how much more of that good, and any necessary intermediary 
goods, would be necessary to achieve a b a l a n c e . 1^5 Resource 
allocation in material balance planning differs markedly from a 
market economy, where if the quantity of coal demanded by an industry 
or a corporation exceeds the quantity of coal supplied at prevailing 
prices, the relative price of coal will rise until the quantity 
demanded equals the quantity supplied. Under ordinary circumstances, 
users of resources in market economies do not have to queue to 
procure materials, as the price system allows buyers willing to pay 
the current price to have the g o o d s . I n  the planned economies of 
the Soviet Union and its satellites, however, decision makers in the 
planning hierarchy were responsible for balancing the need for 
resources with available supply; prices did not reflect s c a r c i t y .
Gregory and Stuart point out that in the Soviet model, material 
balance planning was a highly intense negotiating process at all
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levels of the central planning hierarchy. Officials in the 
ministries, regional and local authorities, the enterprises and the 
Party struggled, bargained and cajoled for r e s o u r c e s . 168 Although
this type of system had its positive points, i.e., that the 
government could target resources at industries they deemed 
strategic, the often unrealistic output targets and lack of flexible 
access to supplies in many cases led to stockpiling of materials by 
enterprises.169 By overstating input requirements to their immediate 
superiors, managers were able to procure materials they could later 
trade or reserve for future use. Stockpiling had two major 
implications, both of which had long-term environmental implications:
1) scarce resources stand idle and are thus wasted; and 2 ) planners 
get inaccurate information.17° Material balance planning is also 
sluggish in practice; enterprises would often get their finalized 
targets for the year as late as March. As a result, enterprises often 
had to rush to meet output targets, engaging in intensive production 
known as "storming."1^1 The negative implications of storming during 
certain times of the year likely manifested themselves in unusually 
high emissions levels and worker fatigue, both of which may have had 
an effect on human health. Another negative aspect of planning in 
the Soviet model was that managers were often reluctant to introduce 
new (and sometimes cleaner) technologies that may have called for a 
restructuring of established supply channels.
Material balance planning was not the only aspect of the 
command economy with negative implications regarding resource use. As 
discussed in section 2.1, Soviet bloc economies were heavily 
dependent on brown coal, which has lower energy yields than harder 
coals used in Western Europe. As is the case in many industrialized 
countries, in the Soviet Bloc energ prices did not take into account 
the cost of externalities, or pollution. With oil prices 
artificially low as part of the command-economy structure, 
individuals and industry consumed more than they actually needed, 
without regard for the market value of the fuel, and factories bore 
no financial penalty for excessive u s e . 1^3 Junz writes in the 
American Economic Review: "...the CMEA group has traded on the basis 
of raw material inputs, particularly energy, at below world market 
prices. This has led to capital stocks and production structures, 
that, in market terms, are wasteful." Without pressure to produce 
products as energy-efficiently as possible, industries were left with
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no incentive to innovate new manufacturing techniques and develop new 
technology, resulting in what Junz refers to as capital structures 
left in a state of "technological s e n i l i t y . A  1987 World 
Resources Institute study comparing energy use in OECD countries and 
central Europe found that artificially low prices were the principal 
reason for central Europe's higher energy i n t e n s i t y . A lack of 
clear property rights compounded the problem of high-intensity energy 
use. Since all property was owned by the state, decision-makers were 
free to order the exploitation of energy resources according to their 
own set of criteria, without necessarily regarding any danger of 
possible depletion of that r e s o u r c e . A private mining firm in a 
market economy, by contrast, in theory would have an interest in 
controlling mining output in order to keep prices at a desirable 
level. Industries, meanwhile, under the state-owned system had 
little incentive to avoid polluting the property on which their 
plants were located. Environmental fines were rarely imposed, and 
when they were, the logic of their very existence was questionable: 
The state would, in essence, be fining itself, since the large 
polluting enterprises were owned by the state. Ministries and 
industries included the cost of fines for pollution as part of the 
regular budgetary process. \
Gregory and Stuart point out tl^ at theoretically, environmental 
degradation should not exist in a socialist system, because in a 
centralized decision-making system, planners should take into account 
externalities. Thus, no environmental disturbances should occur. In 
fact, externalities should not even exist, since nothing is 
theoretically external to the decision-makers. Theorists making 
the point that there need not be any reason for environmental damage 
in a socialist system include Oskar Lange, who wrote in 193 8 that 
under socialism, the price system will be more comprehensive and, in 
effect, a high value will be placed by the central planning apparatus 
upon a clean e n v i r o n m e n t . 1^9 19 69, Maurice Dobb similarly argued
that although information availability and digestion may be a problem 
in the real world, socialist planners will tend to make decisions 
with maximum global vision and concern about environmental i m p a c t .  
Both Lang and Dobb had valid points about theoretical socialism, but 
a retrospective view of organization and planning in the Soviet-style 
economy shows that in practice, environmental protection is 
outweighed by other concerns.
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Instead of using prices and markets to determine relative 
scarcity, the Communist economies prior to 1989-90 had elaborate 
bureaucracies whose purpose was to decide how much enterprises should 
produce in order to keep the economy functioning. The Soviet economy, 
the model upon which many of the satellites were based, had as its 
primary actor the Communist Party. The Party's role was to devise 
overall economic policy, make key appointments in the economy and 
monitor economic activity from the highest to the lowest level.18^ 
Beneath the Party was a hierarchical system of councils, directorates 
and ministries, all of which took part in some way in the planning 
p r o c e s s . 182 the Hungarian economy, which was based on the Soviet
system, the Party's organ for such activities was the People's 
Economic Council of the Central Committee. The Council was 
responsible for determining the overall framework of needs and 
coordinating the planning bodies and the economic ministries. Those 
conclusions then went to the Planning Office, which determined 
approximate preliminary plan figures through material balance 
planning described a b o v e . 183 These preliminary plans were then passed 
on to the Hungarian ministries, which outlined in more detail yearly 
and quarterly individual plan directives for a number of industrial 
directorates. The directorates,^bne step below the ministries in the 
hierarchy, outlined detailed plan directives for the enterprises 
under their jurisdiction. The enterprises, in turn, detailed plan 
suggestions for their divisions and plants. It was at this level 
that the actual determination of workers' activities occurred. The 
plan suggestions were sent back up through the hierarchy in what 
Swain calls "reaggregating." From these reaggregated figures, the 
Planning Office determined its actual plan figures which were then 
"disaggregated" down the h i e r a r c h y . ^84 The goal of the planning 
process was to assess the needs of industry via consultation with the 
various levels of economic bureaucracy. The final plan became law, 
and bureaucrats and workers at each level of the hierarchy was under 
legal obligation to implement it. The plans were ambitious, as shown 
by the details of the goals for heavy industry in the first five-year 
plan (see figure 2.2). Significantly, the plan did not give details 
of where the necessary resources would come from to meet the 
targets.^ 85
Exacerbating the already stiff competition for resources was 
the system of financial incentives that were designed to reward top
71
managers of enterprises for successful plan c o m p l e t i o n . ^86 Managers 
had little incentive to innovate not only because of the 
uncertainties of supplies, but also because of uncertainty created by 
technological c h a n g e . ^87 The pressure to meet or exceed output 
targets for their own personal gain caused managers to further 
stockpile materials. Because they are judged on the basis of output 
target fulfillment, not on the basis of environmental protection or 
conservation of natural resources, managers had little incentive to 
conserve resources or monitor industrial e m i s s i o n s . ^88 The lack of 
environmental interest groups of any strength, at least until the 
1980s, was also a factor in the continued heavy use of resources, 
regardless of their unchecked effects on the e n v i r o n m e n t .^89
The sheer size of the task of planning all economic activity 
bureaucracy was, according to Swain, a detriment to economic 
e f f i c i e n c y . 190 Because the planning periods were very short, there 
was little attention shown to detail. In the case of Hungary a 
ministry's proposals for the coming year, based on proposals received 
from enterprises under its control, had to be passed to the Planning 
Office by the end of October. The Planning Office then had only two 
weeks to present its plans to the People's Economic Council. The 
detailed figures then had to be êent to the ministers by 20 November. 
The ministries, in turn, had only one week to break down the plans to 
enterprises, which then had until 8 December to divide the annual 
targets into quarterly plans. By 1 January of the year for which the 
plan was drawn up, each workshop theoretically should have had a 
fully disaggregated plan. Monthly data on production had to be 
published regularly about 1 1/2 weeks into the following month.
Swain cites the preoccupation of the planners with managing data, so 
much so that they had little time to devote to strategic and long­
term planning.191
The intricate planning process had a bureaucracy to go with it: 
In Hungary by early 1953, there were 17 economic ministries, 
including separate ones for local industry, state farms and 
construction materials. The heavy and light industry ministries on 
their own supervised 70 directorates. In 1949, the number of 
employees in state administrations was 17 0,00 0. Four years later it 
was 260,000, and in 1956 it had swelled to 280,000.192 1949, the
wage costs for non-productive employees was 4.53 forints per tonne of 
coal. By 1954, the wage bill for these employees had increased 184%
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to 12.89 forints, even though the wage level for employees in this 
sector remained mostly s t a t i c . 193 Constant revisions of plans 
required major readjustment, particularly if the change affected 
another enterprise, since all inter-enterprise relations occurred 
from the center. In Hungary in 1952, the current five-year plan was 
changed 472 times and the year plan for 1952 was changed 113 
times.194
The structure of international trade between the Soviet Union 
and CEE neglected the capitalistic thesis of comparative advantage, 
which maintains that individual states will gain by specializing in 
certain activities.195 Soviet-style economies, with their emphasis 
on mining, metallurgy, and other heavy industries, were by nature 
trade aversive due to the belief that socialistic states should be 
largely self-reliant. From the inception of the Soviet regime, the 
accepted Marxist-Leninist theory established that trade with the 
capitalist world as ideologically undesirable; comparative advantage 
was rejected along with other capitalist practices. Gregory and 
Stuart point out that trade even within the Soviet bloc was 
underdeveloped due to uncertainties outside relations introduced into 
the planning process.19^ While much of the bias toward heavy 
industry in the bloc originated frq^ the Soviet Union, some CEE 
states favored industrial policies which boosted their individual 
self-reliance. Romania, for instance, embraced a policy of expanding 
a heavy industrial base on largely nationalistic lines, while Hungary 
opposed providing support for an expansion of Polish coal mining, 
instead preferring to develop its own far less well-endowed 
d e p o s i t s . 197 The end result was a bias toward highly polluting heavy 
industry throughout the b l o c . 198
Summary
The politicization of economics in the former Soviet bloc prior 
to the political changes of 1989 is the key to understanding how 
central and eastern Europe arrived in its present state of 
environmental degradation and possibly its poor public health. With 
political goals such that high output and military strength came 
before consumer goods industries, the environment was a subject 
which, at least among the government planners, was scarcely discussed 
as a issue relevant to the economic process. Virtually every aspect
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of the command economy had some negative effect on the environment. 
The imbalance in industry favoring highly polluting enterprises, 
combined with a lack of incentive to innovate new and cleaner 
industrial technologies, contributed to the degradation of the 
region's environment. The lack of a clear assignment of property 
rights, as well as a pricing mechanism for natural resources, led to 
overconsumption and the failure to incorporate externalities into the 
price of energy sources. The pressure on enterprise managers to meet 
output targets caused them to overstate their energy needs and 
stockpile scarce resources. Last but not least, the use of highly 
polluting and less efficient fuels led to lower gross domestic 
product per unit of energy use. The cumulative effect of the 
economic and political system in CEE, if the Hungarian government is 
to be believed, has had a marked effect on human health and well 
being in the region. What exactly is being done about that will be 
the subject of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
WESTERN AID AND PROSPECTS 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
break-up of the political and economic structures of the East Bloc 
left the states of CEE in a state of turmoil and uncertainty. The 
economies, for the reasons described in Chapter 2, were in crisis, 
and the relative well-being of the populations, measured by their 
state of health, was far below the rest of Europe.1 Huge national 
debts had accumulated during the 198 0s in order to prop up ailing 
industries and maintain the population's standard of living. The 
World Bank estimates that Hungary's external debt in 1989 was $20.6 
billion, with borrowing per capita at $218.2 This compares with 
Poland, which despite having more than twice the amount of external 
debt in 1989, had borrowing per capita of just $7.20.3 Hungary, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and others acknowledged that their command 
economy systems had failed to live up to expectations, but the job of 
restructuring proved more difficult than anticipated. Initial 
flirtation with the free market ^ exposed the need for widespread 
changes in production and distrilmition, management practices and 
resource utilization, as well as the^need for investment in public- 
sector infrastructure projects and social guarantees for those who 
would be affected by liquidation and restructuring of state 
enterprises.4 The CEE states needed technology transfer, technical 
assistance, and especially investment to aid in structural 
adjustment, privatization and environmental rehabilitation,5
The reaction by Western governments to the economic, 
environmental and social problems that emerged in CEE after 1989 is 
subject to debate. Widespread perceptions are that Western leaders, 
in their jubilance over the apparent end of the Cold War, 
underestimated the difficulties the CEE states would encounter in 
their transitions to Western-style democracy and free markets. 
However, the analysis that the West was operating under a veil of 
naivete in 1989-90 does not take into consideration that its 
jubilance must have been partly a reaction to several years of 
uncertainty and confrontation. The pressure associated with decades 
of Cold War —  including massive arms buildups, geopolitical
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struggles, and, toward the end of the Cold War, talk of an "Evil 
Empire" -- was lifted as the Berlin Wall came down piece by piece. 
This chapter describes some of the multilateral steps taken since 
1989 which show that underlying West's optimism in 1989-90 was 
caution, not naivete. A hard-line coup in the Soviet Union in August 
1991, though unsuccessful, reaffirmed the West's sense of caution, 
reinforcing efforts to establish stability in the East.. In the years 
following the major political changes of 1989-90, the West knew 
action had to be taken quickly to keep the former Soviet Union and 
CEE from slipping into economic and potentially political crisis.^ 
Establishing stability was a priority, not only for security reasons, 
but for economic ones as well. Based on examples to be addressed 
below, it is possible to infer that bilateral aid and investment may 
not have seemed to be a coherent enough policy to guarantee 
prosperity and stability in the newly independent East Bloc states, 
which found themselves islands in an economically interdependent 
Europe. Multilateral efforts at stability in CEE would quickly 
secure the region as a future market for Western goods and a 
potential target for Western investment, similar to the objectives 
the Marshall Plan accomplished in Western Europe following W W I I . 7 
Just as the pluralist theorS-sts of international relations 
maintain, from a Western perspective tbe realization that economic, 
political, as well as environmental, crises could erupt in CEE forced 
the West to view the disintegration of the East Bloc as an 
interdependent phenomenon.® A region with a history of ethnic strife 
(animosity between nationalities in the Balkans provided a catalyst 
for WW I) and a transboundary environmental crisis on the scale of 
Chernobyl meets Keohane and Nye's criteria of interdependence 
discussed in Chapter 1.® States in Europe, and indeed the world, are 
mutually dependent on each other for stability and safety; the 
"reciprocal effects" of severe nuclear fallout blowing from one state 
to the next is catastrophic, and ethnic strife can set off a chain 
reaction of events that could prove costly and dangerous.4® After 
the political changes in CEE in 1989, the West knew it must act 
collectively to promote order and stability. The West's reaction to 
the economic and environmental crisis in CEE, while not extensive, 
has not been insignificant, nor has it been naive. Within a few 
years of the political changes in CEE, the following were set up : an 
international development bank for the region with a mandate to
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strive for sustainable development, a technical assistance program 
from the European Union to prepare CEE for future EU membership, an 
information clearinghouse on the environment based in CEE, and 
countless technology transfer and joint venture agreements with 
Western firms. This chapter will focus primarily on examples of 
collective action from the West to the 1989 changes in CEE, though 
some attention will be given to bilateral assistance from the US, 
which, when considered along with assistance from the EU, can also be 
interpreted as part of a larger multinational effort.
3.1 THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
During a political crisis or major change such as that which 
occurred in CEE in the late 1980s, the way in which other states 
react is often symbolic of their long-term intentions, not just for 
the region in question, but for their overall approach to 
international r e l a t i o n s . In May 1990, 40 states and two European 
organizations, the European Community and the European Investment 
Bank, signed an Articles of Agreement to establish the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), whose purpose would be "to 
foster the transition towards Qp^ market-oriented economies and to 
promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and 
East European countries committed to and applying the principles of 
multiparty democracy, pluralism, and market e c o n o m i e s . " ^2 iphe EBRD, 
based in London with resident offices throughout the East, was 
intended to fill a niche in the business of international lending.
It has a strong microeconomic outlook, i.e, emphasizing the 
development of the private sector, and its lending and investing are 
dedicated exclusively to the states of CEE, as well as to those of 
the former Soviet U n i o n . 3^ in these ways, the EBRD differs from the 
World Bank, whose activities are not targeted at any one region and 
whose focus is "to promote economic development that benefits poor 
people in developing countries," thus its emphasis on macroeconomics 
and structural adjustment, with less of a focus on the private 
s e c t o r . 44 The EBRD is required to have 60% of its activities focused 
on the private sector, and assists with reducing the role of the 
state through demonopolization and privatization. The EBRD is 
involved with state-owned enterprises undergoing privatization, 
existing private companies, as well as the creation of new companies.
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including joint ventures with international strategic investors.45 
The remainder of the EBRD's funding is directed toward infrastructure 
or other public-sector projects. In states where the private-sector 
is more advanced, such as in Hungary, the bank is able to achieve a 
higher level of private-sector activity than in poorer CEE states, 
where it targets its lending and investing more toward the public 
sector.45 The EBRD is the first international financial institution 
with a mandate in its founding charter on environmental protection 
and restoration. The bank states in its policy guidelines that it is 
required to "promote in the full range of its activities 
environmentally sound and sustainable development."47 The founding 
of an international bank for CEE on these principles is indicative of 
the strategic importance Western Europe, the United States and others 
see for the region in the future, from an economic, political and
environmental perspective.
The EBRD's shareholder breakdown is as follows: members of the
European Union, the EU itself, and the European Investment Bank, 51%; 
United States, 10%; Japan 8.5%; CEE and states of the former Soviet 
Union, 12%; and other states, 18.5%. As an organization, the EU s 
shareholding is 3 0 , 0 0 0  shares, or 3 %  of the total, the same holdings 
as the European Investment Bank. \Fran#e, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom each hold 85,175 shares, or about 8.5% each. Canada, 
with less that 3.5%, is the smallest EBRD shareholder of any member 
of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations.48 In ECU terms thus 
far, the bank's largest board-approved project financings have been 
in the telecommunications and financial institutions sectors. In 
terms of numbers of projects approved, the largest sectors are 
financial institutions, manufacturing and agribusiness.49 Board 
approval of a project does not necessarily mean the money is 
automatically disbursed, as many projects must wait to be signed, and 
then once signed are often held up for reasons beyond the bank's 
control. One source of delay is that the loan agreement may require 
the passage of certain legislation in the country involved, and until 
it passes the funds cannot be disbursed.2® As of September 1 9 9 4 ,  the 
EBRD since its inception had approved projects totalling 4.5 billion 
ECUs, but only 8 1 3 . 6  million ECUs had been d i s b u r s e d . 24 The slowness 
of disbursements presented problems for the EBRD in its first year.
In April 1993, an article in the Financial Times reported that the 
bank has a record of loan disbursements lower than the amount the
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bank had spent on itself. In its first 20 months of operations, the 
EBRD spent 160 million ECUs on outfitting its offices and paying its 
staff while distributing only 126 million ECUs to its target 
countries.22 Theo Waigel, the chairman of the bank's board of 
governors, rebuked Jacques Attali, the president, for spending money 
on Italian marble for the bank's headquarters, private jets and 
lavish parties.23 The scandal eventually led to Attali*s resignation 
in June 1993.24 under the new president, Jacques de Larosière, the 
bank approved 91 investment projects in 1993, compared with 54 in 
1992.25
The EBRD's stated goals incorporate an environmental and a 
political mandate, to assure the development of a private sector that 
observes the principles of sustainable development as well as human 
rights.26 It seeks to halt, albeit gradually, the degradation of the 
environment and assure the market economies of CEE develop in a way 
that will depart from the environmental abuses of the past.27 The 
EBRD's policy guidelines state that "major environmental 
improvements, direct restorative investments and integration of 
environmental concerns into new investments are prerequisites for the 
successful transition to a market-oriented economy."28 The EBRD 
promises assistance to the countries of CEE in forming environmental 
policies, developing legal and regulatory instruments, adopting 
appropriate emissions and effluents standards and creating the 
institutional and professional structure to monitor and enforce 
them.29 The bank also states that it will encourage the development 
of environmental goods and services industries in the countries where 
it operates, as well as promote commercially viable investments in 
environmental technologies and pollution prevention and control.20
As part of its general activities, the EBRD requires 
environmental assessment, planning and environmental monitoring 
procedures throughout the life of its projects, a key determinant in 
guaranteeing the achievement of its policy g o a l s . 21 The bank is 
particularly aware of the lack of adequate legal and regulatory 
procedures in CEE to deal with the environmental problems which 
resulted from the old economic system, as well as new environmental 
problems that may arise as the states become targets for foreign 
investment and d e v e l o p m e n t .22 Eight principles, borrowed from the 
European Community's Single European Act of 1987, outline the bank's 
goals :
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• preventative action to avoid environmental degradation;
• development and implementation of effective national 
policies, environmental standards and monitoring systems;
• promotion of the efficient use of natural resources (e.g., 
energy, water, raw materials, etc.);
. adoption of the polluter-pays principle wherever possible;
• establishment of primary responsibility for environmental 
damage ;
• due regard for economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness;
• recognition that legal instruments should be readily 
applicable and enforceable; and
• involvement of local and national authorities, technical 
experts, non-governmental organizations, affected populations and the 
general public in environmental matters.23
The EBRD's stated environmental goals are integrated into every 
aspect of the project preparation and approval process.24 During the 
very early stages of a project, the bank requests that project 
sponsors provide relevant information about the project, including 
environmental information. It is at this stage that the level of 
environmental investigation required is determined.25 Next is an 
environmental screening, which al^o occurs during the exploratory f 
stages in the life a project. The bank's staff determine the 
environmental information required and whether the project will later 
require an environmental assessment or audit. In addition, any 
suggestions for environmental benefits and enhancements to the 
project are put forward.26 The next stage is an investigation 
conducted to generate any information required by the bank. If a 
project is deemed as having significant environmental impact, a full 
Environmental Assessment may be carried out.27 The project is then 
reviewed, and any environmental covenants are incorporated into the 
loan agreement. While a loan is being supervised by the bank, 
observation takes place to ensure the environmental measures 
specified in the loan agreement are being carried out. Once the 
project is completed, an environmental evaluation is written and 
provisions made for any necessary environmental monitoring.2® 
Additionally, EBRD staff is required to find ways in which the public 
can participate in a project by checking for available information on 
NGOs and for any history of the bank's involvement with them. Using 
information from the EBRD, the United Nations and local resources.
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searches are carried out for grassroots organizations in the area 
affected by the project. Once found, their technical expertise are 
sought during the environmental assessment process, as well as their 
input on the community's understanding of the p r o j e c t . 2 9  In its 19 93 
annual report, the EBRD states that its principal contribution to 
improving the environment in CEE is "investment in projects that are 
more energy and resource efficient and less polluting than the 
facilities they replace." In particular, the bank seeks to invest in 
modern energy production and transmission and encourage closure of 
old, polluting f a c i l i t i e s . ^0 Examples of such investment include 
gas-fired power plants and gas pipelines to reduce dependency on 
lignite. For new or upgraded industrial plants, the bank encourages 
cleaner technologies, better resource utilization, waste minimization 
and contamination c l e a n - u p . The bank unequivocally states that 
"environmental deterioration in the countries of central and eastern 
Europe has reached such alarming proportions that economic growth and 
the maintenance of the social fabric depend upon restoring the 
environment. ""^ 2
The EBRD's political mandate is designed to assure the 
development of democracy and a legal system, which it states as being 
essential in the CEE states' transition to market economies: "...the 
successful transition of member countries to market-oriented 
economies is closely linked to parallel progress towards democracy 
and the rule of law. "^ 2^ ib states as requirements that participating 
states hold free elections and have representative government in 
which the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or the 
electorate. The bank states that it is the duty of a state's
government and public authorities to act in accordance with the
constitution and law, and that the state must be separate from 
political p a r t i e s . 44 states must have an independent judiciary and 
provide equal protection for all, including minorities, under the
law, and criminal procedures must be fair. People should be
guaranteed freedom of speech, press, association and peaceful 
assembly, as well as of conscience and religion. They should be 
guaranteed freedom of movement, the right to private property and the 
right to form trade unions and to s t r i k e . 45 The EBRD's efforts at 
encouraging public participation and consultation in the preparation 
of projects, as described above regarding the environment, is a 
direct outgrowth of its political mandate; for some of its projects.
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the EBRD encourages the establishment of consumer protection 
bodies.46 The EBRD requires its Board of Directors to review at 
least annually the bank's operations and lending strategy in each CEE 
state to ensure that EBRD requirements are met.47 The bank further 
assesses the progress of states through cooperation with other 
institutions and NGOs, such as the Council of Europe. States that 
are admitted to the Council of Europe and ratify the European 
Convention on Human Rights are viewed favorably.48 Failure to meet 
the bank's political requirements, depending on the degree of 
departure from the set principles, are grounds for postponement of 
proposed operations, restrictions on operations already underway or 
outright suspension of operations.49
Hungary is one of the more advanced loan and investment 
recipients, and as a result 85% of the EBRD's activities there have 
been in the private s e c t o r . ^0 Because of Hungary's large external 
debt, the government is hesitant to guarantee loans, so loans are 
made primarily through an intermediary called a concession company 
that acts as g u a r a n t o r . ^4 Some recent activities include a loan, co­
financed with Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), to Framochem Kft, a 
Hungarian joint venture owned by a French firm and a Hungarian firm. 
Though the loan was only for 3 million ECUs, it was used to upgrade
and enlarge Framochem's plant, which produces chemicals for theNplastics and agrochemicals industries. " The EBRD said in a news 
release the loan will be used to increase health and safety 
standards. An environmental action plan, presented to the EBRD by 
Framochem, aims to increase maintenance levels, personnel safety and 
environmental training. Another example of an EBRD project with 
environmental impact was a 61-million-ECU loan to the Municipality of 
Budapest to improve its public transport system. Mario Sarcinelli, 
vice-president of the EBRD, said the loan will improve the service 
quality of the bus and tram system in Budapest, reducing noxious 
emissions by about 24%, as well as moving the Budapest Transport 
Company toward "commercialization." The loan was to be used to 
replace one-quarter of Budapest Transport's bus fleet and upgrade a 
further one-third of the company's bus engines. The remainder of the 
financing for the project came from the World Bank and the Municipal 
budget.^2
The EBRD's approach to the changes in CEE represents a 
commitment on the part of its multinational shareholders to link
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environmental rehabilitation and market reform, a link necessary if 
sustainable development is to be achieved.^2 Encouraging appropriate 
legislation, public participation and environmentally responsible 
investment projects is the EBRD member states' way of encouraging 
economic and political stability in the region.^4 Foreign investment 
which disregards the environment would compound the pollution that 
already exists from the pre-1989 economic system, and failure to 
address existing pollution could discourage future investment.55 The 
EBRD's stringent environmental requirements are an important model 
for other investment in the region, and represent the short- and 
long-term intentions of Western industrialized states.
3.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION PHARE PROGRAM
As an international organization acting in the interests of its 
12 member states, the EU's reaction to the changes in CEE in 1989-90 
was to plan for the eventual integration of the former Soviet bloc 
states into the EU through the Europe Agreements, which establish 
economic, political and cultural cooperation.56 The EU's actions 
during the period following the political changes to the East 
represent the recognition by its rt^ m^ber states that achieving 
stability and prosperity in CEE is necessary to the stability and 
prosperity in Europe. The EU's intentions are in this way similar to 
the intentions behind the formation of the EBRD.57 in December 1991, 
the then-European Community signed association pacts with Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia (after division the Czech and Slovak 
successor states established individual relationships with the EU). 
Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria followed.58 The Community 
stated as its goals for the agreements eventual free trade with the 
EC, industrial, technical and scientific cooperation, a long-term 
program of financial support, and a mechanism for political 
dialogue.59 The agreements state the Community's aim to secure 
industrial free trade by the end of 10 years.^8 The EU's venue for 
coordination of economic, technical and scientific cooperation is the 
PHARE program (Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring of Economies).^4 
The PHARE programme was conceived in July 1989 at the Paris meeting 
of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations, where the G-7 charged 
the European Commission with the coordination of international aid to 
Poland and Hungary.PHARE has since become the EU's central
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mechanism for assistance to central and east European countries in 
their transitions to market economies. The programme was extended to 
Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in mid-1990, to 
Albania and the three Baltic republics in December 1991, and to 
Slovenia in summer 1992. Yugoslavia was dropped from the programme 
in 1991 due to the civil war and subsequent disintegration of the 
state.G3 Funding for PHARE is provided by the EU budget' and given 
via grant. According to the PHARE information office in Brussels, the 
program thus far has had a total budget of 4.284 billion ECUs, of 
which 9% has been allocated to nuclear safety and the environment.^ 4 
The programme's goal is to lay the foundations for market 
economies while supporting the development of civil institutions. 5^ 
PHARE aid programmes emphasize private-sector development in 
agriculture, industry, investments, energy, education, environmental 
protection, trade and services. Its "instruments of reform" include 
support of parliamentary practices, human rights, independent media, 
the development of non-governmental organizations, local democracy 
and education.G6 PHARE does not support programmes of macroeconomic 
stabilization, nor does it provide export guarantees or risk capital 
for the establishment of private firms. 7^ Though PHARE was meant to 
end in 19 92, it was extended in or&hr to assist countries which 
joined after the program's inception and to continue to prepare all 
participating states for greater integration with the EU.G8 The 
extension will take into account the association agreements, as well 
as progress toward reform. PHARE's focus will continue to be 
technical assistance, although some activities will focus on the 
stimulation of investment. The program's scope will be extended to 
investment in small and medium-sized enterprises, regional 
reconversion activities and agricultural restructuring. The EU 
expects the EBRD and other institutions like it to play a major role 
in attracting and securing investment for the region. 9^
PHARE's priority areas for Hungary include assisting in the 
country's economic transformation through strengthening market 
elements, helping to create infrastructure and institutions, and 
assisting in creating a healthy e n v i r o n m e n t . 70 PHARE's aim is to 
concentrate on a limited number of problem areas, and identifying 
projects which are likely to show major and fast results at 
relatively moderate costs. In 1990, the PHARE program committed 100 
million ECUs to Hungary, 21 million of which were targeted at the
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development of small- and medium-sized e n t e r p r i s e s .71 The program 
sought to promote private-sector activity through providing support 
for loan financing, technical assistance and business services. Of 
the 100 million ECUs budgeted for Hungary, 25 million were applied to 
the PHARE Environmental Protection Program. Among the environmental 
program's goals were to strengthen air and water monitoring capacity, 
improve waste disposal and nature conservation, and reduce harmful 
industrial emissions. In addition, 2 million ECUS was budgeted for 
the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe in 
Budapest.72
Another aspect of the 199 0 PHARE funding for Hungary included 5 
million ECUs for the Technical Support for Privatization Program, 
which included training for the staff of Hungary's privatization 
body, the State Property Agency, as well as funding of office 
equipment and foreign consulting services for to address 
privatization c a s e s . 73 An additional 1.3 million ECUs was budgeted 
for modernization of foreign trade infrastructure, including the 
supply of equipment for testing and certification laboratories of 
goods destined abroad. Twenty million ECUs were slated for a market- 
oriented agricultural program, and 5 million for technical assistance 
to the Hungarian banking and financb industries. The 1990 budget also 
provided 3 million ECUs for science and technology research, 4.5 
million for higher education and vocational education, 6.2 million 
for TEMPUS, or Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies, 
as well as 3 million for social programs such as job-creation 
schemes.74
In 1991, PHARE budgeted 114 million ECUs to Hungary, including 
10 million ECUs for environmental protection.75 The 1991 
environmental protection program included programs on air pollution 
abatement, municipal solid waste and nature conservation management. 
PHARE also emphasized the preparation of a national environment 
strategy, including policy-making, organizational development and a 
public awareness campaign.76 other aspects of the PHARE program in 
1991 included a 40-million-ECU Enterprise Restructuring and 
Privatization program, which by far constituted the largest 
proportion of the 1991 budget. The program consisted primarily of 
technical assistance to those responsible for privatization of state 
industries.77 The next largest budget appropriation in 1991 was for 
the privatization of agriculture and agroprocessing at 13 million
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ECUs. Among the remaining budget appropriations was 5 million ECUs 
for energy, which covered assistance for the restructuring of the
coal and electricity sectors.
Hungary received a PHARE budget allocation of 104 million ECUs 
in 1992, of which a newly defined sector, "Environment, Energy and 
Infrastructure" received 10 million.79 Sixty percent of the 
environment, energy and infrastructure budget was spent on direct 
investment, and over 30% on feasibility studies.^9 Special attention 
was given to develop policies aimed at reducing harmful effects from 
production, consumption and transportation.^4 other aspects of the 
1992 budget included 16 million ECUs for the TEMPUS program, started 
in 1990 with an allocation of just 6.2 million. Further assistance 
was provided in 1992 for the Small— and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
program: 11 million ECUs, which included establishing special 
services for small- and medium-sized enterprises in local banks. 
Another 10 million ECUs were budgeted towards an upgrade of the 
Hungarian statistical system. The assistance is targeted at enabling 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to become a main supplier of 
information required by the structural changes occurring in Hungarian 
society. Priorities were ensuring easy access to reliable 
information and assisting in the ij^tegration of the Hungarian 
statistical system into the European standard. Another aspect of the 
1992 budget, the General Technical Assistance Facility for the 
Implementation of the Europe Agreement, with a budget of 4 million 
ECUs, had as its goal the identification of economic and financial 
barriers to Hungary's eventual integration with the European Union. 
For 1993, the PHARE budget allocation for Hungary was 100 million 
ECUs, including 30.5 million for agriculture, 31 million for private- 
sector development and small— and medium—sized enterprises, and 16 
million for education and t r a i n i n g . T h e  1993 budget did not 
allocate funds for the environment, as the Hungarian government did 
not request it; funds from earlier years were still being used up. 
Funding for 1994 (proposed at 85 million ECUs) includes 15.5 million 
ECUs for energy and the environment, the bulk of which is to be used 
for the environment, and 16.5 million for private-sector 
development.
One of PHARE's cross-border activities that is part of a larger 
multinational effort is the Environmental Program for the Danube 
River Basin. Under the program, PHARE is involved in a scheme to
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monitor pollution levels in the Danube. Agriculture, as well as 
industries such as mining and pulp and paper manufacturing, have 
compounded the problem of pollution in the Danube in the several 
states through which it passes on its way to the Black Sea.
According to the PHARE information office, the Danube's most acute 
pollution problems originate not in central and eastern Europe, but 
from cow manure in the German state of Bavaria. The Danube Accident 
and Emergency Warning System, based on similar programs for the Elbe 
and Rhine rivers, links 11 alert centers along the river's path.
Water quality monitoring and reporting takes place in order to warn 
states down the river of problems coming their way. The program's 
central office in Vienna coordinates a database on toxicological and 
operational information regarding the river, and all alert centers 
are linked by a satellite communications system.
About 3.5% of the total PHARE budget for CEE is allocated to 
nuclear activities, and a large chunk of that is used for safety and 
repair programs at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. 
Despite the plant's outdated technology and problems with safety, it 
has had to be maintained rather than dismantled because it supplies 
40% of^Bulgaria's electricity. Electricity demand in the country 
is expected to grow by as much as^l4% between 1990 and 1995, and by 
9% over the following five years."The Dukovany power station in 
the Czech Republic is also undergoing safety studies, some of which 
occurred off-site, and the Bobunice site in Slovakia is receiving 
extensive assistance with a large number of experts o n - s i t e . i n  
Lithuania, the two units at the Ignalina power plant received safety 
equipment and technical expertise under the PHARE program. The Paks 
nuclear power plant in Hungary is, according to PHARE, one of the 
best run plants in Eastern Europe, and requires the least amount of 
assistance.^ 4
3.3 THE US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The US has responded to the political changes in CEE with a 
program that has similar objectives to the PHARE program; support and 
assistance for private-sector development, economic restructuring, 
pluralism, environmental rehabilitation, and the drafting of 
accompanying legislation to provide the legal framework for 
transition to democratic market-based s y s t e m s . 2^ in 1990, the US
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Support for Eastern Europe Democracy Act (SEED Act) was passed by the 
US Congress designating the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) the coordinator of US assistance to CEE. 2^ Under the SEED 
Act, assistance has been authorized through USAID for Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Other legislation, the Freedom Support Act, provided aid 
for the former Soviet U n i o n . 94 USAID distributes funds to such 
recipients as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy and US 
environmental consulting firms to provide technical assistance and 
advisory services to government and industry in CEE.95 The agency 
states that solving the environmental problems in CEE "will require 
significant policy changes, more efficient environmental investments 
in both the public and private sectors, and more effective 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ."96 Helping CEE to attract investment for private- 
sector projects is a priority; thus AID'S emphasis on encouraging 
legislation to deal with such sticky issues for foreign investors as 
liability for pre-existing environmental degradation. Since 1990 
when USAID became the coordinator for aid to CEE, $1.53 billion have 
been committed to aid for the r e g i o n . 9 7
USAID's priorities for assistance to Hungary are privatization 
and business infrastructure development, financial sector reform, 
helping to address select key social issues such as unemployment, and 
improving environmental quality.98 As of September 1993, committed 
funds for US SEED assistance to Hungary totalled $152.25 million.99 
US aid to Hungary falls under the following categories: Banking and 
Financial Services, Divestiture and Privatization, Enterprise 
Development, Management Training, Energy, Telecommunications, 
Agriculture, Trade and Investment Promotion, Environment, Housing, 
Labor, Health, Private Voluntary Initiatives (such as the YMCA) , and 
Democratic Initiatives.400 The agency's objectives for environmental 
assistance to Hungary include the reform of environmental and 
economic policies, including pricing, legislation and regulation; 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public-sector 
environmental investment; and supporting the expansion of private- 
sector involvement. The AID-coordinated programs are, for the most 
part, low cost and training oriented.401 The US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), for instance, provided training to the
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Ministry of Environment in enforcement of environmental laws, risk 
assessment, financing and environmental investments, hazardous site 
ranking at the national level, and environmental impact assessment. 
The EPA training is aimed at improving public-sector performance. In 
addition, the EPA has advised the Hungarian government on wetlands 
preservation and fund-raising for environmental projects. The EPA 
also organized environmental education for local governments, primary 
school teachers and communities to increase awareness about the 
e n v i r o n m e n t .402 other USAID-funded projects provided training for 
staff members of the State Property Agency on environmental liability 
and procedures related to the privatization process, and technical 
assistance to the Ministry of Finance on principles of environmental 
economics, development of economic instruments and financing. 
Environmental economists assisted the Hungarian government in 
reforming fuel taxes.403 In the area of energy, USAID-funded efforts 
are varied. Early in the SEED program, USAID provided a $10 million 
energy sector grant to support the major energy price reforms adopted 
by the Hungarian government. US funds helped cushion the price 
increases for fixed-income energy customers such as pensioners and 
large f a m i l i e s . 404 addition, the US Department of Energy has
implemented a small program of training and technical support to 
improve the safety of operations at Hungary's Paks Nuclear Power 
Plant. USAID assistance also influenced the design of a project by 
the Municipality of Budapest to require catalytic c o n v e r t e r s . 4 0 5  
Other energy-oriented activities include management training to 
Hungarian energy service c o m p a n i e s . 4 0 6
The SEED Act that established USAID's functions in CEE also 
provided $5 million to set up the Regional Environmental Center (REC) 
for Central and Eastern Europe, an independent, non-governmental, 
non-profit o r g a n i z a t i o n .407 The idea for the REC was put forward by 
US President George Bush during a visit to CEE in 1989.408 The 
center's other founders included the EU and Hungary; other donors 
include Canada, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands New 
Zealand and Norway. Based in Budapest, with outreach offices in 
Warsaw, Bratislava, Bucharest and Sofia, the REC has collected large 
quantities of information and data on the environment in CEE.409 As 
well as functioning as an information clearinghouse and sponsoring 
conferences and workshops, the REC has organized task forces to 
advise governments on the drafting of l e g i s l a t i o n . 43-0 The REC's
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stated mission is to "address the host of pressing environmental 
problems, common throughout the region, though the development of a 
civic s o c i e t y , "414 and also to promote "ecologically sustainable 
development".412 The center accomplishes this through encouraging 
interaction and cooperation among environmental groups in the region, 
and acting as a catalyst for the support of organizations and 
Individuals-that develop or implement solutions to environmental 
p r o b l e m s . 443 The center cites the constituencies it serves as non­
governmental organizations, national governments, local and municipal 
governments, academic and scientific institutions and businesses, 
with a special emphasis on supporting grass-roots environmental 
movements. Above all, the REC seeks to influence policy making and 
promote transboundary and international cooperation on environmental 
114issues .
Stephen Wassersug of the Environmental Protection Agency, who 
during his three-year secondment to the REC participated in advising 
the Hungarian government regarding environmental liability, typifies 
US activities in the region. Wassersug believes that among Hungary's 
biggest environmental problems are a lack of effective laws, a lack 
of effective training, outdated infrastructure and the fact that the 
country's institutions are in k Rtate of t r a n s i t i o n .445 a speech
to a business conference in Washington, D.C., Wassersug quotes a 
survey conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the World Bank on the impact of environmental issues 
on western industrial investments in the region. The survey concluded 
that environmental issues such as soil cleanup and uncertainty of 
emission standards present impediments to Western investment. Nearly 
62% of survey respondents indicated that environmental issues are 
equally important impediments to investment as non-environmental 
issues such as unstable economic reform and exchange-rate r i s k s . 446 
"US investors do not want to get stuck with another lemon site, where 
unlimited future liability haunts.... Unfortunately, there are 
generally no clear working policies or legislation for handling 
privatization. Potential investors from the US visit the region 
[and] often leave discouraged when faced with the lack of a policy 
and inability to calculate the investment costs. Many governments 
have simply not faced up to the relationship between investment and 
environmental l i a b i l i t y . " 447 Hungary is a good example of a state 
without a new and improved environmental law448 t:o address investor
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liability, despite efforts by foreign advisers to assist in the 
formation of such a l a w . 449
USAID's work is not simply charitable; under the SEED Act a 
large portion of funds are applied to the activities of US 
consultants involved in advising Hungary on the environment or 
creating feasibility studies for potential projects. For instance. 
World Environment Center, a non-profit New York-based consulting 
firm, provides US industry consultants to visit Hungary and offer 
technical assistance and training in industrial environmental 
efficiency, industrial health safety, pollution prevention and 
environmental e c o n o m i c s .420 The experts provide environmental 
assessments and suggestions for industrial process and management 
reforms. In the case of one Budapest battery plant, worker lead 
exposure was reduced to zero based on World Environment Center's 
recommendations. The experts provide their services pro bono (travel 
expenses provided by AID) and in exchange might manage to drum up 
business for themselves following their recommendations.421 The 
Hungarian response to such capitalistic assistance is mixed. Some 
industry and government officials criticize both US-AID and PHARE for 
not using Hungarian consultants and engineers, others wish the 
foreign "donors" would shift from writing 'feasibility studies to 
engaging in investment in solid p r o p h e t s . 422 one Budapest newspaper 
article, addressing the tide of consultants pouring into the country, 
quotes a Hungarian entrepreneur. Péter Laszlo, as saying: "What we
need from the west is investment. We are fed up with father-like 
advice, rules and classes and teachings. We know our own problems, 
we know what we need to achieve, we can best figure it out for 
ourselves."123 The reality, however, is that bilateral and 
multilateral aid is limited, and technical assistance is the dominant 
theme. For loans and investment, CEE will have to look to the EBRD 
and other international lenders.
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Conclusion
The body of this work has demonstrated that multilateral 
activities in CEE have played a key part in setting precedents for 
sustainable development, thus establishing that a pluralist 
theoretical approach is a useful framework for evaluating the 
problems of environmental degradation in the region. Environmental 
activities by the EBRD, the EU and the US, while only scratching the 
surface of CEE's financial needs (one estimate for achieving a 7 0% 
reduction in SO2 emissions was $8.6 billion^), are noteworthy because 
they constitute a large portion of the environmental aid to the 
region. The EBRD, with its mandate to strive for environmentally 
sound and sustainable development, has set an example for future 
investment in the region. The bank's stringent environmental 
evaluation requirements, particularly its policy of involving grass­
roots organizations in local projects, go a long way toward 
differentiating between sustainable development as a concept confined 
to discussion at international conferences and a concept that is 
implemented in a tangible and meaningful way. The European Union has 
also contributed to setting higher environmental standards in CEE 
through its PHARE program. Though PHARE has been criticized for 
allocating much of its funds to technical assistance and feasibility 
s t u d i e s , 2 and not enough to actual investment, its underlying goal of 
incorporating central and east European states into the EU is 
significant; its requirement that CEE must meet EU environmental 
standards before accession will contribute towards improving the 
region's environmental performance. The US AID program, though it 
also tends to emphasize technical assistance and advisory services 
over actual project investment, has made some headway in changing 
mindsets in CEE about potential paths to development. The REC is a 
good example of a US-spearheaded activity that has encouraged local 
participation in addressing environmental issues as well as 
encouraging international cooperation in the region. By functioning 
as a regional information clearinghouse, the REC has provided a 
valuable resource for potential investors seeking assistance with 
such issues as environmental liability.
Chapter Two provided the historical background to the 
environmental crisis in CEE. For a state such as Hungary, the
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establishment after WWII of a planned economy, modelled after the 
Soviet Union's, put the country on a path of economic development 
that by its very nature contributed to a systematic degradation of 
the environment. Natural resource allocation was governed by 
political goals for production, rather than on the basis of supply 
and demand; this, combined with a lack of a pricing mechanism to 
determine relative scarcity, contributed to overconsumption of energy 
resources. The resulting impact on the environment included high SO2 
and NOx emissions per dollar GNP. The system of central planning, 
with its demanding output targets, did not encourage resource 
conservation or technological innovation, and in fact resulted in the 
overuse of resources. After the political changes of 1989-90, the 
availability of information from CEE into the public domain exposed 
health problems in the region that can not easily be explained, but 
may be related to environmental pollution. Life expectancy, infant 
mortality and deaths from illnesses such as respiratory diseases and 
cancer show that CEE is far worse off than its Western neighbors.
Viewing CEE's environmental problems in the context of the 
global environmental debate is useful in that it highlights the fact 
that the region has not yet been incorporated into that debate. The 
absence of any significant discussion on the region at UNCED in 1992, 
so soon after the dramatic political changes of 1989-90, is testament 
to the fact that CEE environmental problems are not being perceived 
for what they are: transboundary, multi-faceted and in some cases a
serious threat to human health. As stated in Chapter 1, the lack of 
attention to CEE at UNCED may be due to the fact that the region in 
some peoples' minds is still a "bloc" rather than a large group of 
states with distinct problems and challenges. However, a grimmer view 
is that five years after the "Democratic Revolutions" of 1989, 
interest and commitment to CEE may have declined to the point where 
economic restructuring in the region, let alone environmental 
degradation, has faded from the public consciousness. The G7 
conference in Naples in July 1994 is a further example of limited 
international interest in environmental degradation in CEE. The 
final communique contained nothing specific on the environment, short 
of an "action plan" for the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant in Ukraine.^ The only specific mention of funds for the 
Chernobyl action plan was "an initial amount of up to $200 million 
in grants." The rest was vague, saying, "loans should be provided by
104
the international financial institutions," and calling on "other 
donors" to join the action p l a n . 4 The lack of specific financial 
promises in the communique regarding Chernobyl makes any significant 
action plan difficult to fathom; ensuring the future safety and 
clean-up in the area surrounding reactor Number 4, the one that blew 
up in 1986, alone will cost about $1 b i l l i o n . 5 The G7 communique's 
section on the environment (listed separately from the section on 
nuclear safety) did not even mention CEE.^ Perhaps the only hope for 
getting the problems in CEE recognized as part of the global 
environmental debate will be when the region's economies become 
competitive enough to warrant discussions about a level playing field 
in trade relationships.
Determining the central and east European states' prospects for 
achieving sustainable development is difficult, primarily because the 
governments and the people are so absorbed with economic 
transformation and its accompanying social and political demands that 
their interest in the environment, which seemed so avid in the few 
years prior to 198 9, has d e c l i n e d . 7 The dwindling of central and 
east European environmental activism is evidence of this phenomenon.& 
The pressure to create jobs, provide health care, and bring the 
general quality of life up to Western standards has pushed 
environmental concerns down on the political agenda. The CEE states' 
problem is straightforward: Their economies are restructuring, their
environments are degraded, and, when forced to choose, people would 
prefer to have the basic necessities of life -- and a few non­
necessities as well -- rather than a flue gas desulfurization unit at 
their local power plant. Taking the environment into consideration 
when rebuilding an economy is a luxury some states seem to have 
decided they cannot afford. In the case of Hungary, determining the 
government's intentions is difficult. The government's report to 
UNCED showed little hesitation in blaming the old regime for 
Hungary's environmental problems, referring to the country's 
"backward economic structure" and "sluggish and out-of-date" 
production units, as well as going a step beyond the World Health 
Organization and others in linking some health problems with 
environmental pollution. While these statements are not false, and 
in fact hold much truth, the lack of action to enact a new and 
comprehensive environmental law, despite extensive foreign advisory 
assistance on the subject, is evidence that the environment is not
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high on the list of priorities. In the recent Hungarian election,
the environment was not a major issue on the agenda; as Janos
Zlinszky at the REC in Budapest asserts, no party was going to win or
lose the election based on its environmental stance during the 
gcampaign.^
Pearce, Barbier and Markandya, as stated earlier, call 
sustainable development "fuzzy," with "no neat s o l u t i o n s . " 4 0  in the 
case of CEE, this statement holds particular applicability. Just as 
the Brundtland report maintains, economic development and 
environmental quality are inextricably linked; when applied to CEE, 
however, that link is tenuous. Sustainable development can only be 
achieved at a cost -- a cost states in the region do not seem willing 
to bear. The Brundtland report does point out that the pursuit of 
sustainable development must take into consideration the idea of 
limitations imposed by "social o r g a n i z a t i o n s . " 4 1  in CEE, those 
limitations are the lack of political determination, the lack of 
public willingness to make sacrifices for the good of the 
environment, and the limited ability or desire of other states to 
provide aid and assistance. Ruth Bell of the US Environmental
Protection Agency sees hope for CEE in the "mosaic" of education and
 ^ f\technical assistance that can be provided at a relatively low cost
through foreign advisory s e r v i c e s . 42^
In 1993, a 32-poster poem in English and Hungarian lined the
walls of the Parliament underground station in Budapest. The
following is an excerpt:
As she has fed you
For endless centuries
You must decide now
What you will do
For your vanishing Danube
Her flow has never been blue
Nor has it ever been green
You learned too little
From your river-fearing fathers
Like water through the fingers
Your future slowly drips away.
The sponsors, Fuji film, Coca-Cola, Canon and Peron, seem to have put 
their finger on the pulse of Hungary's environmental predicament. A 
popular perception about the states of CEE is that their governments 
should seize the opportunity to learn from the West's mistakes, as 
well as their own, and diligently strive to restructure their
1 0 6
economies in a revolutionary new way —  a sustainable way. 
Unfortunately, the pressure to strive for a "better," more Western 
life, and its material trappings, seems to be weighing against 
efforts towards environmental rehabilitation. At the moment, the 
ideal of sustainable development in Hungary, and elsewhere in the 
region, seems just that: an ideal.
4 Joseph Alamo, ed.. Coping with Crisis in Eastern Europe's 
Environment (Camforth, England: Parthenon Publishing Group, 1992), 
pp. 7-8. Citation in article did not define what states constituted 
its reference to "CEE."
2 Another criticism of the PHARE program is that its environmental 
expenditure has "fallen alarmingly" in recent years and that some 
feasibility projects are carried out "without due consideration of 
the cost and affordability to CEE countries' governments and 
enterprises." The criticisms came in a session document of the 
European Parliament, by the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection, on the environmental aspects of the 
PHARE program in Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics.
3 Group of Seven Industrialized Nations, Summit Communique, July 9, 
1994, pp. 4, 6 .
 ^ Ibid., p . 6 .
 ^Mike Edwards, "Living with Chernobyl," National Geographic, August, 
1994, p. 110.
6 Group of Seven Industrialized Nations, gp. cit., p. 4.
7 Bernd Baumgartl, "West Provides No New Aid to Clean Up Eastern 
Europe," RFE/RL Research Report, ^ o l . 2, rfo. 29, 16 July 1993.
® Duncan Fisher, pp.. cit., pp. 1-4.
 ^Personal interview by telephone with Janos Zlinszky, Team Leader, 
Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
September, 1994.
40 David Pearce, Edward Barbier, Anil Markandya, Sustainable 
Development: Economies and environment in the third world (Aldershot, 
Hants: Edward Elgar Publications Ltd., 1990), p. x.
44 World Commission on Environment and Development, pp. cit.. p. 43. 
42 Personal interview with Ruth Bell, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Washington, D.C., August 1993.
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FIGURES
Figure 1 Life expectancy at age 1, in years
Figure 2 Infant mortality rate, per 1,000 live births
Figure 3 SDR* malignant neoplasms, ages 0-64.
Figure 4 SDR diseases of respiratory system, ages 0-64
Figure 5 SDR bronchitis/emphysema/asthma, all ages
Figure 6 Annual cigarette consumption per person, in units
Figure 7 SDR chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, all ages
* Standardized Death Rate is a statistical measurement whereby comparative 
old-age mortality is taken into account.
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